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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three essays examining the effects of education and job-related 
training on promotions and wages in Germany, the effects of a reduction in Unemployment 
Insurance duration on the likelihood of joining welfare in Germany, and examining the debt-
asset and debt-income ratios across different income levels in Canada. 
The first chapter uses the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) to investigate the 
relative impacts of education and job-related training on job promotions within different 
occupation levels. The panel data allow me to control for the confounding effects of unobserved, 
time invariant, individual specific characteristics, and unobserved temporal shocks. My findings 
suggest that the recent job-related training increases the probability of promotion to middle level 
occupations, but has no significant effect on promotion to high and executive level jobs and on 
the corresponding wage increase. This effect appears greater for women than men. Although 
men have, on average, a higher probability of promotion and corresponding wage increase, job-
related training increases the likelihood of promotion for women more than men. Moreover, the 
job-related training raises the probability of promotion to middle level jobs for higher educated 
employees more than for lower educated ones. That is, job-related training complements the role 
of higher education in increasing the probability of promotion to middle level occupations.  
The second chapter uses the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) to investigate how 
a reduction in the length of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits may affect the likelihood of 
joining a welfare program for the individuals who have used UI benefits in Germany. If the UI 
program is not helping to return the unemployed to employment, the UI users may transition to a 
welfare program such as Social Assistance (SA) which provides financial support to low income 
households. Any modifications in the UI system might affect this transition. The results show 
that a less generous UI system, in terms of a reduction in UI duration, as a result of the Hartz 
reforms in Germany, increases the hazard of joining welfare. 
Lastly, the third chapter uses the Survey of Financial Security (SFS) to calculate the 
ratios of average total debts to total income and assets across different income levels over three 
years of 1999, 2005, and 2012. The debt-income ratio increases for all income levels over theses 
 iv 
 
three years. The average debt-income ratio for low-income households earning less than $40K is 
4.3 in 1999 and 6 in 2012 suggesting that these households owe, on average, 4.3 dollars in 1999 
and 6 dollars in 2012 for every dollar they earn. The debt-asset ratios have also increased for all 
income levels in 2005 compared to the ones in 1999, but this ratio has increased in 2012 only for 
income levels greater than $80K. The findings suggest that power of households to pay back 
their debts, specifically for low income households, decreases from 1999 to 2012. The main 
sources of the increasing indebtedness of Canadians over these years are found as the debts on 
mortgages on principal and non-principal residences. 
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Chapter 1. The effects of education and job-related training on promotions and wages: 
Panel data evidence from Germany 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Understanding the relative impacts of educational attainment and job related training on 
promotions and wage growth is particularly important for firms and policymakers interested in 
encouraging productivity.
1
 From the firm’s perspective, providing job related training motivates 
an employee for a performance improvement and higher productivity. Following the theory of 
human capital in Becker (1964), job related training is a human capital investment which either 
increases employees’ performance in their current job, or prepares them for a higher level 
occupation or higher income. Job related training can also be used as a screening device for 
employers to learn about employees’ abilities and to select more productive workers for 
promotion to a higher job position. Training might benefit a higher educated employee more than 
a lower educated one if this worker has a higher ability to learn in the workplace. In this case, 
training is a complement to educational attainment. On the other hand, training might be a 
substitute for higher educational attainment if employees with lower levels of education use the 
job related training programs to obtain the required skills they did not receive through their 
formal education. 
Analyzing the relative impact of education and job related training is also important for 
helping policymakers to determine whether more resources should be allocated to higher 
education or towards financing job training programs. Certainly, with respect to Canada, there 
has been an emphasis on government-funded programs such as the Canada Job Grant that 
encourages accumulation of occupation specific skills.
2
 In a similar vein, some European 
countries have implemented the work program “Education and Training 2020” (ET 2020), which 
                                                     
1
 Job related training courses are usually held by companies, governmental education centres, or private training 
institutions. 
 
2
 Based on this program, firms are eligible to apply for a maximum $5,000 federal contribution per person to train 
Canadians for an existing occupation at eligible training institutions. Including provincial/territorial and employer 
contributions, the grant could provide $15,000 or more per person. Provinces and territories are responsible for the 
design and delivery of the Canada Job Grant in their jurisdictions. For further details, please see Canada’s Economic 
Action Plan at http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/initiative/canada-job-grant. 
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is a new policy framework for European cooperation in education and training aimed at 
enhancing human capital accumulation. The program focuses on recent and forthcoming labor 
market reforms to improve the employability of higher education graduates and also to develop 
shorter training courses for a variety of occupations (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 
2013).
3
  
A number of studies have investigated promotion and corresponding wage increases as 
outcomes of high productivity.
4
 Some empirical papers also study the likelihood of promotion 
and wage growth over different educational levels and on-the-job training, separately.
5
 However, 
there is a relative paucity of econometric studies that have simultaneously investigated the 
relative impacts of these two human capital investments on promotions. This study contributes to 
the literature by exploiting individual level panel data from the German Socio Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) to examine the relative impacts of education and job related training on promotions 
and corresponding wage increases across different occupation levels. The information available 
from the GSOEP is particularly rich. Given the availability of career related and socio-economic 
data across individuals over a number of years, the GSOEP allows the researcher to assess the 
long run effects of formal education and job related training on probability of promotion and 
wage growth.  
From the perspective of identification, the use of individual level panel data allows for an 
unbiased assessment of the effects of education and job training. Employing pooled cross-
sections could result in biased estimates of training programs’ effects. Specifically, the cross-
sectional data are based on individuals’ responses at a single point to whether they ever took a 
                                                     
3
 The program focuses on four education and training groups: early school leaving (ESL), higher education, youth 
employment and vocational education and training (VET) and lifelong learning. For further details, please see 
Education and Training in Europe 2020: Responses from the EU Member States at  
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/thematic_reports/163EN.pdf 
 
4
 Lazear and Rosen (1981), Waldman (1984a), Rosen (1986), Meyer (1992), Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994 a, 
b), Bernhardt (1995), Gibbs (1995), and McCue (1996). 
 
5
 Bognanno (2001) offers evidence that wage dispersion upon promotion is greater for more educated workers and 
argues that the probability of promotion and corresponding wage increases rise with education levels. On the other 
hand, DeVaro and Waldman (2012) find that wage dispersion upon promotion is greater for less educated 
individuals. 
 3 
 
job related course. Since the affirmative responses will be more prevalent among individuals 
with more ability or more motivation in the workplace, the coefficient estimates of job related 
training on promotion probability would then be biased upwards. Therefore, to control for such 
unobserved heterogeneity, it is necessary to follow an individual’s career path over time in 
assessing the correlation between job related training and career advancement of employees with 
different educational levels.
6
      
This study finds that training increases the probability of promotion to middle level jobs, 
and it has a complementary role for higher education within this promotion level. However, there 
is no evidence that training affects promotions to high or executive level jobs. The study also 
suggests the importance of job related training for women, specifically in low level jobs in order 
to enhance their productivity and likelihood of corresponding promotion. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is discussed in 
section II. Section III describes the data and variables used in this study, and section IV 
illustrates the descriptive analysis of data on the relationships among education, training, and 
promotion. Section V develops the empirical models and reports the main findings, and section 
VI concludes.   
1.2 Literature Review 
Evaluating the determinants of job promotion and wages is of key importance in labor 
economics. The seminal theoretical research is based on the tournament models of Lazear and 
Rosen (1981). They suggest that promotion and corresponding wage increases are basically 
prizes to the winners of labor market tournaments in which firms commit to pay high wages to 
the workers in higher rank positions and lower wages to the workers in lower rank jobs. The 
greater spread between high and low wages induces workers to increase their effort which might 
consequently raise workers’ productivity. More productive workers would be promoted to higher 
positions and receive higher wages as a prize for their efforts.
7
  
                                                     
6 
The unobserved ability which is correlated with training and education creates an omitted ability bias in the 
estimates. By using panel data and random effects estimations, we control for this unobserved ability effect. 
7
 Other papers include Waldman (1984a), Rosen (1986), and Meyer (1992). 
 4 
 
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994 a, b) offer some evidence that education increases 
probability of promotion. The underlying principle is that education results in skills 
development, which enhances employee productivity and the probability of promotion.
 
Baker et 
al suggest that “fast learner” employees, the ones who accumulate human capital more quickly, 
have the most career success in a firm.8 McCue (1996) also shows a positive relationship 
between higher education and wage increase associated with promotion.9  
Nevertheless, some studies find that the high life-time earnings come from sustained high 
productivity, even after receiving a promotion, and not just from the promotion itself. Gibbs 
(1995) extends the market-based tournament approach of promotion and suggests that increasing 
high productivity is a crucial factor for income growth. Some studies find that job-specific and 
firm-specific initiatives are important for a sustained high productivity increasing wage growth. 
In this regard, Bernhardt (1995) extends the model of Waldman (1984a) and employs an 
asymmetric learning model by allowing the employees to gain general or specific training during 
their working periods. He shows that receiving more training after the first promotion might 
sustain the high productivity of promoted workers and keep sending accurate signals about their 
productivity to the market for the second round promotion tournaments.
10
 Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1998) also develop a model in which firms provide job related training. They argue that firms’ 
willingness to offer job-related training is affected by worker firm-specific tenure and the firm’s 
incentive to increase worker productivity.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
8
 They use personnel records for 68,437 employees from a medium-sized US firm in a service industry over the 
years 1969-1988.  They also investigate job mobility within a firm and offer evidence that employees do not move 
from one job to another job through competitions. They argue that career paths are determined and stable in an 
organization that creates a long term worker-firm attachment.  
 
9
 McCue (1996) uses a panel data of 50,660 person-year observations from Michigan Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics (PSID) during 1967-1988 and show that higher education increases the wage growth corresponding to 
promotion. 
 
10
 He also takes the time of receiving promotion into account and argues that if promotion happens earlier in a 
worker’s working period, it reveals that the advantage of promoting the worker to a higher level job exceeds the 
disadvantage of releasing the private information on her high productivity. That is, the time of promotion depends 
on the importance of workers’ skills in the market. 
 
 5 
 
Furthermore, a limited number of papers consider training on the job as a determinant of 
promotion since job training might raise employees’ productivity. In this respect, Pergamit and 
Veum (1999) examine the factors affecting promotion among trained individuals in different 
firms and suggest that trained workers are more likely to be promoted than untrained workers; 
men more than women; and whites more than blacks or Hispanics. The findings suggest an 
evidence of discrimination in the absence of jobs and firm-specific characteristics.
11
 Zabojnik 
and Bernhardt (2001) also find that more human capital, obtained through job training, is a main 
determinant of promotion. They argue that those firms which have more trained workers have 
more promotion. In this respect, firm size is an important factor affecting the amount of training 
offered by firms, such that larger and more technology intensive firms usually have more trained 
workers who receive promotions. Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) suggest a positive relationship 
between firm size and wage growth.  
In addition to firm size, hierarchy in firms also affects wage increases. Bognanno (2001) 
shows that wage growth is positively correlated with the occupational positions in the firm. His 
results suggest that wage increase, as the “tournament prize”, rises with education as well as with 
the number of competitors for the CEO. positions.
12
 Based on the tournament theory predictions, 
the probability of winning a promotion tournament for CEO positions is less affected by 
workers’ effort when there are more competitors. Therefore, the wage difference between CEO 
positions and lower positions must be large enough to increase effort. However, Bognanno does 
not consider the effect of job training along with the effect of education in his analysis to see 
whether taking training courses affects the job mobility of CEOs. 
With respect to the effects of training, Almeida and Carneiro (2009) also estimate the rate 
of return to firm investments in job training by using a census of large manufacturing firms in 
                                                     
11
 They estimate probit and fixed effect models by using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The 
data consist of 3,355 men and women for private sectors in 1989 and 1990. 
 
12
 The study uses 73,062 observations based on 25,000 managers and executives (four executive job levels) from 
600 US corporations during 8 years, 1981-1988. The dependent variables are ln(CEO pay), ln(VP pay), ln(CEO pay-
VP pay), and ln(CEO prize). The independent variables are the number of executive board members and its squared 
term, CEO age and its squared term, years at CEO and its squared, mean of VP age and its squared term, mean years 
of education and its squared term.   
 6 
 
Portugal between 1995 and 1999. The return to job training is measured by estimating the change 
in marginal product of employees in the production function. They find that investing in job 
training has a high return which is comparable with the return on investments in schooling. 
However, the relationship between training and education is not identified in their analysis to see 
how the rate of return on job training would differ among individuals with different levels of 
schooling.  
In terms of research that specifically focuses on the effect of job training on promotion, 
Melero (2010) suggests that the career path of women is affected by training activities. However, 
this is not the case for men.
13
 Instead, the career progress of men is impacted by other factors 
such as overtime work. Melero (2010) concentrates only on the impacts of job-related training; 
he does not take individual educational attainment into account. Conversely, DeVaro and 
Waldman (2012) investigate the effects of education on promotion and wage growth, but do not 
assess the impacts of job training. Their results suggest that while higher education increases the 
probability of promotion, the wage increases associated with promotion are smaller for more 
educated individuals.
14
 Cassidy, DeVaro, and Kauhanen (2012) find comparable results with 
German data.
15
 Moreover, they show that the results are stronger for first promotions as opposed 
                                                     
13
 The data for this study come from 12 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) over 1991-2002, and 
it includes 37,140 observations from 7894 individuals. The dependent variables are probability of promotion and 
wage growth. The independent variables include gender race, education, training, tenure, experience, firm size, 
region, the local unemployment rate, union status, occupation, and industry. The study considers different 
unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of fixed effects logit for probability of promotion. The independent 
variables in this estimation include job-related training, year-specific dummies, overtime work dummy; a set of 
individual characteristics such as education, firm seniority, job experience; a set of firm characteristics such as size, 
industry, region, and degree of unionization; and job characteristics such as bonus payments, part-time status, type 
of contract, and managerial responsibilities. 
  
14
 The data used in this study are a complete set of annual personnel records during the 1969-1988 for all white male 
managerial employees of a medium-sized US firm in the financial services industry. DeVaro and Waldman (2012) 
theoretically and empirically show that the high ability signal associated with a promotion is stronger for low-
educated workers than for higher-educated ones. Therefore, the wage increase upon promotion must be high enough 
to stop a bidding war in the market over the lower educated workers, and the firm’s incentive to distort the 
promotion decision is consequently higher for lower educated workers. 
 
15
 Cassidy et al. (2012) use the annual German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) survey of German households over 
1984-2009 for 99,748 observations. They estimate OLS and multinomial probit models for which the dependent 
variables are wage changes and probability of promotions within and across the firms and the independent variables 
 7 
 
to subsequent promotions, which is true for both across and within firm promotions. Addison et 
al (2014) also investigate the roles of gender, education, and job sector on probability of 
promotion and wage changes. They estimate a fixed-effects model using data from the NLSY79 
and find that the private-sector female employees with a high school degree are significantly less 
likely to be promoted in early career than their more educated counterparts. Their results indicate 
that wage growth associated with promotion is higher for men than for women. However, these 
studies do not consider the role of job-related training in examining the determinants of 
promotions. 
In total, the literature suggests that controlling for all else, a highly educated worker is 
more likely to be promoted. However, the relative effects of education and job training have not 
been identified. There is a dearth of research with respect to the following questions that are 
investigated in this study: (1) how does the probability of promotion change if a less-educated 
worker receives job training?; (2) does training increase the likelihood of promotion for a low-
educated employee more than for a higher educated one?; (3) What are the differences in these 
effects across different job levels?; and (4) how do education and job training affect wage 
increase associated with promotion in different occupation levels?  
The relative impact of education and job related training in promotion analysis is 
important for policy makers to decide how many resources should be allocated to higher 
education or job training programs to increase productivity. In this study, I investigate the 
relative effect of education and job training, which is identified by interaction terms between the 
two variables, on promotions in different occupation levels and on the corresponding wage 
increase.    
1.3 Data and Variables 
I employ individual specific panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). The GSOEP is a longitudinal data set that has been conducted every year in the 
Federal Republic of Germany from 1984 to 2010 and eastern German länder (provinces) from 
                                                                                                                                                                           
include worker performance, age, age squared, experience, experience squared, job tenure at the firm, job tenure at 
the firm squared, industry codes, occupation codes, occupation group, and hierarchical levels. 
 8 
 
1990 to 2010. This survey includes information about household composition, occupations, 
employment, earnings, health, and a variety of other questions related to individual attitudes and 
opinion.  
The analysis in this study focuses on individuals who report being employed and working 
full-time. The sample includes only workers in the age of 20 to 65 who have been in full-time 
positions at least for three consecutive years to fully capture the possibilities of occupation level 
changes. I use 54,196 observations for 12,373 individuals from West Germany in 15 years: 
1988-90, 1992-94, 1999-2001, 2003-05, and 2007-09. These fifteen years are selected for the 
estimations since only these years have information on training courses taken by employees.  
To define training variables, I follow Pischke (2001), Büchel (2002), Georgellis and 
Lange (2007), and Burgard (2012). I specifically use a series of questions on job related training. 
The first question is:  
There are different opportunities available if one wants to educate himself further. Think 
back on the last three years. Have you in that time period read scientific or professional 
publications, attended professional conventions or congresses, or participated in professionally 
oriented courses? 
Workers who reported taking training courses in the past three years were asked more 
questions about the courses: start year of training course, purpose of taking course, information 
about course certification and organizer, and source of financial support for the course. All these 
questions have been asked in the survey years of 1989, 1993, 2000, 2004, and 2008. The training 
courses are reported as job related training which may have used for adjusting to new demands in 
the current job, introducing to a new job, or creating more qualifications for a professional 
advancement. I consider the start year of training courses reported at these survey years and 
define the training dummy variable for fifteen years based on the start year of training. Training 
dummy equals 1 if individuals have reported that the start year of their training course was last 
year.  
I also use individuals’ information from the previous year of the sample years to include 
lagged variables for previous occupation level and to define the promotion variable based on job 
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mobility from a lower to a higher level job in two consecutive years. The GSOEP has a question 
that identifies the current job position of workers. Possible responses to this question are: blue-
collar, white collar, civil servant, trainee, and self-employed. I exclude self-employed workers 
and the ones who responded affirmatively to the trainee category, as my focus is on full time 
employees who have finished their training within the past three years and are currently working. 
Therefore, my sample only includes blue-collar, white-collar, and civil servants.
16
 There are four 
job levels in the civil servant category which can be used to define similar levels in the blue and 
white collar occupations. These four levels are defined in a hierarchical occupation ladder: (1) 
low-level job = unskilled or semiskilled work; (2) middle-level job = skilled work; (3) high level 
job = highly skilled work; and (4) executive level job = executive work.
17
 
After defining the hierarchical occupation level variable, I employed the correction 
procedure used by Cassidy et al. (2012) in order to reduce the possibility of spurious level 
changes. In this correction procedure, if a worker changes job level between two consecutive 
years and returns to the initial level in the third year, the transition is considered as a mis-
measured change. Therefore, I change the job level of second period to the level of first and third 
periods because it is unlikely that a worker who gets promoted to a higher level job will be 
demoted to the initial level in the year after promotion.
18
 After this correction, about 6.6% of the 
sample has an increase in their job level, which is counted as a promotion rate (this percentage 
was 11% before the correction).
19
 Thus, all changes from a lower to a higher level job are 
                                                     
16
 Blue-collar workers are people who perform manual labor and build or maintain something physically. In the 
GSOEP, these workers are categorized as unskilled workers, semiskilled workers, skilled workers, foremen, and 
master craftsmen. On the contrary, a white-collar worker usually works in an office sitting at a desk. White collar 
workers include industry and works foremen in non-tenured employment, employees with simple duties (e.g., 
salesperson, clerk), employees with qualified duties (e.g., bookkeeper, technical drawer), employees with highly 
qualified duties (e.g., scientific, worker, attorney, or head of department), and employees with managerial duties 
(e.g., managing director, head of a large firm or concern). The third type of worker is civil servant who performs a 
service oriented job in the public sector employed for a government department or agency. This type of work is 
categorised to lower, middle, upper, and executive level jobs in the GSOEP. 
 
17
 See Appendix A for details on the hierarchical occupation level variable defined in the GSOEP data. 
 
18
 I perform this correction only for three consecutive years not for all the periods. 
 
19 This procedure reduced the promotion rate from 10.7% to 5.7% in Cassidy et al. (2012). 
 10 
 
defined as a promotion. For instance, a change from level 1 to 2 or from level 1 to 3, are both 
considered as promotions. However, I distinguish three different levels of promotions in Table 
1.1: (1) promotion level 1, in which job level increases from a low to a middle level job; (2) 
promotion level 2, in which job level increases from a low or middle to a high level job; and (3) 
promotion level 3 where the job level increases from any lower levels to an executive level.   
In terms of other key variables, individual specific net annual income is deflated to 2009 
Euros.
20
 There are also 114 occupational codes and 63 industry codes in the sample which are 
categorized to 10 occupation and industry one-digit codes. The firm size is categorized to “20 
and less”, “Above 20 up to 200”, “Above 200 up to 2000”,  and “Above 2000”.21 Therefore, 10 
occupation, 10 industry, and 4 firm-size dummy variables are included in the model. I also 
incorporate job tenure and job experience variables. Job tenure is the number of years a worker 
spends in her current job position and job experience reflects the total length of full-time 
employment in the respondent’s career up to the point of the interview.22 I exclude observations 
with missing data (which occurs in occupation, industry, firm size, job tenure, or job experience). 
I also exclude executive level workers, since these employees have no chance of further 
promotion, although 15% of them have received job training which might lead to an increase in 
their productivity but not a promotion.  
I also define a set of dummy variables for education categories based on the number of 
education years. Education system in Germany is different than the North American system. The 
3 to 6 year-old German children stay in kindergarten which is optional. The compulsory primary 
school starts at the age of 6 and it usually lasts for four years. At the age of 10, all students start a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
20
 The income variable is calculated hourly by using the monthly “Current Net Labor Income in Euro” variable. The 
variable is deflated in 2009 Euros by using the Consumer Price Index. 
  
21
 The variable of “Core Category Size of the Company” has been used. 
 
22 Job tenure is generated from the respondent’s start date of the current position with the current firm from “Length 
of Time With Firm”. Job experience is extracted from “Working Experience Full-Time Employment” in data file. I 
also construct another job experience variable based on the years of education and age (age minus years of education 
minus 6) to compare the estimation results on the two variables. The results do not change by using this experience 
variable. 
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two-year orientation stage in which they decide how to continue their education. From this stage, 
there are three different types of high schools (Secondary Level I). Each type of Secondary Level 
I is classified based on the future occupational careers, starts at the age of 12, and lasts for three 
or four years. Secondary Level II and other certificates start at the age of 15 or 16 and their 
duration varies based on the programs. At the age of 18 or 19, higher technical schools, colleges, 
or universities are provided based on the educational path that everyone has chosen (see 
appendix B for more explanations). By using the structure of German education system, I define 
four education levels: less than high school (LHS), high school (HS), technical, college, or 
university degree (TCU), and graduate degree (GRAD). Appendix C provides more details about 
how these four variables are defined. 
Finally, as noted by Pischke (2001), the GSOEP is not a representative sample due to 
oversamples of the non-German population. Therefore, in order to generate unbiased estimates, I 
weight the data by using averaged individual-longitudinal weights.
23
 The selection criteria results 
in a total of 12,373 individuals and 54,196 observations over 15 years 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Table 1.2 presents the 
frequency of individuals in the sample. 
1.4 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1.3 presents the number of trained and promoted individuals in each year, and 
weighted descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study (except occupation and industry 
dummy variables) are presented in Table 1.4. Thirteen percent of the sample holds less than a 
high school degree (LHS), 55.2% have a high school degree (HS), 24.2% hold a technical, 
college or university degree (TCU), and 7.5% possess a graduate degree (GRAD). About 31% of 
                                                     
23
 Using the sampling weights, weighted estimates yields unbiased and consistent parameters but with larger 
standard errors (Winship and Radbill 1994). Although there is a trade-off between weighted and unweight estimates 
in terms of biasedness and efficiency, I weight my sample by using the individual weights as an approximation. The 
alternative weights such as product of longitudinal weights and individual weights yielded similar results. The 
individual weights compensate for unequal probabilities of selection and sample attrition and approximately obtain 
population-based statistics. I have calculated the final weights as relative to the mean individual weight for every 
year in the sample. 
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the sample is women. The total average promotion rate is 7.1% for both women and men 
regardless of different promotion levels. However, considering different promotion levels, the 
promotion rate is higher for women than for men in the lowest promotion level (4.1% versus 
3.1%). In the other two higher promotion levels, it is higher for men than for women (2.9% 
versus 2.3% in promotion level 2 and 1.2% versus 0.5% in promotion level 3). 
The average training rate is relatively higher for women than for men (11.2% versus 
10.1%), while the average hourly income for women is lower than for men by €3.21 per hour. 
Further, female workers are disproportionately represented in low and middle level jobs (32% of 
women versus 22% of men have low level jobs), while the percentage of male workers in high 
level jobs is more than female workers (about 28% of men versus 16% of women are in high 
level occupations). 
1.4.1 Education, Age, and Promotion 
In order to investigate the relationship between education and promotion, I calculate the 
average promotion rates for each education group across three promotion levels. As explained in 
Table 1.1, promotion level 1 is defined as a job change from a low to middle level job, 
promotion level 2 is a job change from a low or middle to a high level job, and promotion level 3 
is a job change from any lower levels to an executive level job.  
Table 1.5 shows the distribution of different education groups at time t-1. Less than high 
school degree holders are mostly working in low-level jobs (65%), high school degree holders 
are in middle-level jobs (61%), technical, college, and university degree holders are in middle 
and high-level jobs (50% and 40%), and most graduate degree holders are in high level jobs 
(81%). That is, lower educated employees are working in lower level jobs and more educated 
employees have occupied higher level jobs.  
Column 1 of Table 1.6 reports the corresponding promotion rates for different education 
groups across promotion levels. Based on this table, the average total promotion rates for high 
school and graduate degree holders are higher than the other two education categories (7.4% and 
8.3% respectively). However, I compare promotion rates for schooling levels across different 
promotion levels. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.6 report that average promotion rate increases 
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with schooling. More educated workers are more likely to get promoted in promotions to high 
and executive level jobs. For instance, the highest promotion rates in promotion levels 2 and 3 
belong to graduate degree holders (The rates are 23.1% and 3.6% for graduate degree holders 
versus 2.8% and 0.8% for high school degree holders in these two promotion levels 
respectively).  
Table 1.7 provides the average promotion rates across different age groups and 
promotion levels, and Table 1.8 reports the distribution of age groups across different job levels. 
As the first column of Table 1.7 shows, the highest average promotion rate belongs to the 
youngest employees (7.8%), and the promotion rate decreases for older employees. However, by 
considering different promotion levels in columns 2-4, we find that the youngest age group (20-
29 years old) has the highest average promotion rate from low to middle level jobs (5.5%). The 
older age groups 30-39 and 40-49 have the highest average promotion rates to high level jobs 
(3.2% and 3.1% respectively), and they have a high percentage in high level jobs in Table 1.8 
(31.5%). Finally, the promotion rates to executive level jobs are almost the same for employees 
with the age of 30-65 years old (1.1% and 1.2%).  
1.4.2 Training and Promotion 
Table 1.9 reports the calculated promotion rates for trained and untrained workers across 
education and promotion levels. By comparing promotion rates of trained and untrained 
employees in each promotion level, training seems to increase promotion rates for all education 
levels (except for technical, college or university degree holders which have the rates of 5.9% 
versus 7% for trained and untrained employees respectively). More specifically, training seems 
to tremendously affect promotion rates of all education groups in promotion from low to middle 
level jobs (column of promotion level 1). The promotion rates among ‘less-than-high-school’, 
‘high-school’, ‘technical, college, and university degree’, and ‘graduate degree’ holders in 
promotion from low to middle level jobs for trained versus untrained employees are respectively 
29.5% versus 5.8%, 29.3% versus 16%, 40.4% versus 20.1%, and 55.9% versus 16.1%. That is, 
job mobility from low to middle level jobs seems to be considerably impacted by training among 
all educational categories. However, training does not significantly change the promotion rates of 
 14 
 
employees in higher promotion levels. For example, the promotion rates for trained versus 
untrained high school holders are 4.9% versus 2.6% in promotion level 2 and 0.9% versus 0.8% 
in promotion levels 3.  
In addition, the training effect seems to have a pattern that is consistently associated with 
higher promotion rates for more educated employees than for lower educated ones at promotion 
level I. The increasing promotion rates across education levels state that job training has a 
complement role for education in increasing the chance of job promotion to middle level jobs. To 
see this comparison, we should consider the differences between promotion rates of trained and 
untrained graduate degree holders. For instance, the differences for graduate degree holders in 
promotion level 1 are 55.9% and 16.1% for trained and untrained workers respectively. These 
differences are smaller for lower educated employees at promotion level 1 (29.5% versus 5.8% 
for less-than-high-school degree holders). 
1.4.3 Education and Wage Increase upon Promotion 
Table 1.10 presents the wage increase percentage across education and promotion levels. 
The first column of the table shows that the highest wage increase percentage belongs to less-
than-high-school degree holders among workers with no promotion. The other three education 
levels have lower promotion rates. The second column suggests that as education increases, the 
wage increase associated with promotion increases too (except for high school degree holders 
who have a promotion rate less than the one for less-than-high-school holders). Comparing the 
percentages vertically within each promotion level, the results show mixed results across 
education categories. In promotion to middle level jobs, ‘technical, college, and university 
degree’ holders have the highest wage growth, greater than high school and graduate degree 
holders.  
However, in promotion to high and executive level jobs, excluding graduate degree 
holders, one can say that more educated employees have less wage growth. In these two high 
promotion levels, less-than-high-school degree holders have higher wage growth (3.2% and 
9.2%) than high school (2.6% and 2.4%) and ‘technical, college, and university degree’ holders 
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(2% and 0.7%). Excluding graduate degree holders, this observation is consistent with the 
prediction of DeVaro and Waldman (2012) who suggest that the wage increase upon promotion 
must be high enough to stop the bidding war over the lower educated workers since promotion 
signals their high ability stronger than higher educated workers. However, the associated wage 
increase in this study does not show an increasing pattern with schooling across all promotion 
levels. The relationship between wage growth and education may be more reliable when I 
control for confounding factors in the empirical estimations.  
1.5 Empirical Models and Results 
1.5.1 Probability of Promotion 
Following Melero (2010) and Addison (2014), the relationship between education, job-
related training, and the employee’s output at time t-1 is as follows. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑇𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼6(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1
× 𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼7(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝑇𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼8(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼9(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1
× 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖) + 𝑇𝑡−1𝜂 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝜑
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡−1                                                                                                                           (1) 
{
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 1           𝑖𝑓            𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 ≥ 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 0           𝑖𝑓            𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 < 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃                                                                                       (2) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 ≥ 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃 )                                                                                    (3) 
The variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is the employee i’s actual output at time t-1. In the right hand side of equation 
(1), 𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑇𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡−1, and 𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 are dummy variables specifying whether employee i’s 
education is ‘high school’, ‘technical, college, or university’, or ‘graduate degree’ at time t-1 
(The reference education group is less-than-high-school degree). The variable 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 indicates 
job-related training started at time t-1 and either finished last year or at time t, and 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖 
indicates if the gender of employee i is female. The interaction terms between training, education 
and female dummies are also added to the model. 𝑇𝑡−1 is a vector of year-specific dummies, and 
𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is a set of control variables including individual, job, and firm characteristics such as age, 
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age squared, hourly income, state of residence dummies, job tenure and its squared term, job 
experience and its squared term, occupation dummies, job type dummies (blue collar, white 
collar, or civil servant), job level dummies (low, middle, high, or executive level), industry 
dummies, and firm size dummies at time t-1. The variations in 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1, which are not explained by 
observable characteristics, are included in a transitory shock ϵit−1 which is a stochastic 
disturbance and the unobserved factors that determine the employee i’s actual output at time t-1. 
Equation (2) shows the probability that the employee i is promoted to a higher level job at 
time t depends on the employee i’s output at time t-1 (𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) and a latent promotion threshold 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃 ). In fact, 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃  denotes the minimum output required at time t-1 for promotion at time t and 
it is not observable to the econometrician. Therefore, the following model is considered for 
probability of promotion where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 indicates a dummy variable that represents promotion at time 
t. If individual i receives promotion at time t, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 takes value 1 and 0 otherwise. Equation (3) 
indicates that the employee gets promoted at time t if an employee’s actual output exceeds the 
promotion threshold at time t-1. If the employee’s output is less than 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃 , the employee would 
be retained at the previous job level. 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 is the previous promotion dummy variable.   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖 +
𝛽6(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 ×  𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝑇𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽8(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽9(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 ×
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖)+𝛽9𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝑇𝑡−1𝜎 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛾)                                                                                           (4) 
The specification in equation (4) allows me to evaluate separately the effects of education 
and job training on the probability of promotion. To observe the relative effects of education and 
job training, the interaction terms between training and education dummies are also included in 
the model specification.  
Interpretation of interaction terms in linear models is straightforward. However, the 
intuition from linear models does not apply to nonlinear models. Ai and Norton (2003) suggest a 
method to estimate the interaction effect in general nonlinear models. As Karaca-Mandic et al. 
(2012), following Norton (2003) explain, the marginal effects of explanatory variables including 
the interaction terms in a nonlinear model may change over its entire range. When interaction 
terms are either two continuous variables or one continuous variable and one binary variable, 
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graphical presentation of the model will be very helpful. Since the interaction terms are two 
binary variables in this study, I do not use the graphical presentations of the interaction terms 
because they are not informative. I only calculate the estimated marginal effects by using the 
method proposed by Karaca-Mandic et al (2012) and present them in a table. 
First, assuming there is no unobserved heterogeneity to the econometrician, I use a 
logistic regression to estimate the marginal effects of the observed variables on the probability of 
promotion in equation (4). However, we need to control for the unobserved heterogeneity 
included in 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 affecting the probability of promotion because it is not obvious whether the 
higher educated or trained employees are more likely to receive promotion as a return to their 
skill acquisitions or because they are more talented or have some unobserved skills for more 
advanced job positions.  
From an omitted variables or unobserved heterogeneity perspective, it is appropriate to 
treat the unobserved factors as random draws from the population once we have a large number 
of random draws from the cross section (Wooldridge 2010, p. 252). We should initially focus on 
the correlation between the unobserved effects and covariates in our model to decide whether we 
should use random-effects or fixed-effects model based on this correlation. 
A fixed-effects model assumes that the error term including the unobserved heterogeneity 
is correlated with education and training dummy variables. However, the unobserved factors 
affecting promotion is assumed uncorrelated with covariates in a random-effects model. As 
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) explain, the error term includes fixed and time-varying 
unobserved heterogeneity. The fixed term includes the innate ability that people are born with 
and does not change by time, but the time-varying factors include personality, motivation for 
promotion, and beliefs about innate ability driving promotions that might be uncorrelated with 
covariates.  
Based on their argument, probability of promotion depends on the expected ability 
driving promotion which is formed by the new information that changes current beliefs about the 
ability, and it is uncorrelated with both education and training covariates. Furthermore, when the 
variables of interest are time-invariant, the random-effect model is preferred (Wooldridge (2010) 
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P. 286). In this model, I am not able to assess the effects of education, training, and their 
interaction terms in a fixed-effects estimation because they do not change over time and they are 
either eliminated or estimated imprecisely.  
Grund and Martin (2012) rely on the random-effects estimates since most of their 
variables of interest are time-invariant in determination of further training. Melero (2010) 
presents both random-effects and fixed-effects results yet most time-invariant covariates are 
statistically insignificant in the fixed-effect specification. I also estimate both random-effects and 
fixed-effects specifications against each other. Similar to Melero’s findings, most of the fixed-
effects estimates are insignificant in my study (Appendix D Table 1.21). 
To evaluate the relationship between education, training, and promotions, I use 54,196 
observations for 12,373 individuals from West Germany in 15 years: 1988-90, 1992-94, 1999-
2001, 2003-05, and 2007-09. I investigate whether the effects of education and training vary over 
different job levels. Since the level of education and type of job training differ for each job level, 
their relative impacts on mobility between job levels would also be expected to vary. To analyze 
the relative effects separately for different job levels, I define four promotion dummies and use 
them as dependent variables in equation (4): promotion to all job levels, promotion level 1, 
promotion level 2, and promotion level 3. As specified in Table 1.1, promotion level 1 is defined 
as a change from a low to a middle-level job; promotion level 2 is a change from a low or 
middle-level job to a high-level job; and promotion level 3 is a change from any lower level job 
to an executive level job.  
1.5.2 Results with respect to Probability of Promotion 
Tables 1.12-1.15 contain the marginal effects of regular logit and random-effects (RE) 
logit models for dependent variables: total promotion and promotion to three levels - middle, 
high, and executive level jobs. The first three columns of Tables 1.12-1.15 contain logit marginal 
effects. Column 1 shows the impact of education and training on the probability of promotion, 
controlling for individual and job characteristics and year-fixed effects. Column 2 adds the 
effects of state of residence, and column 3 adds the interaction terms between education and 
training dummies as well as the interaction term between female and training dummies.  
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Columns 4 and 5 of Tables 1.12-1.15 present the marginal effects from RE-logit models 
without and with the interaction terms respectively. The last two columns of Tables 1.12-1.15 
report the overall effects of interaction terms extracted from column 3 (regular logit) and column 
5 (RE-logit) respectively. The overall effects in columns 6 and 7 are calculated by summing the 
marginal effects of training or female dummies with the marginal effects of interaction terms in 
logit and RE-logit models. For example, to calculate the overall effect of training on high school 
degree holders, holding the other variables constant, the expected value of probability of 
promotion for untrained high school holders is deducted from the expected value of probability 
of promotion for trained high school holders.
24
 The standard errors of the models are calculated 
by the delta method proposed by Greene (2008).
25
  
Table 1.12 presents the estimations for total promotion as a dependent variable. The 
marginal effects of education groups are all positive, statistically significant, and increasing with 
the level of education across all columns. That is, fixing other variables, the probability of total 
promotion increases with education. For instance, based on the RE-logit estimates, the 
probability of promotions for high-school; technical, college, and university degree; and graduate 
degree holders are respectively 4.2%, 6.3%, and 10.1% higher than the one for less-than-high-
school holders, and these results are consistent when I add the interaction terms in column 5. The 
marginal effects of education dummies are almost the same in logit and random effect logit 
models.  
Job related training also increases the probability of promotion by 4.2% in RE-logit 
estimations in column 5. In columns 6 and 7 of Table 1.12, the overall effects of training from 
both logit and RE-logit models suggest that training increases the probability of promotion for 
high school degree holders by 2.1% and 1.4% based on logit and RE-logit estimations 
respectively. The effects of training on technical, college, or university degree and graduate 
degree holders are very small and insignificant. Therefore, the results of Table 1.12 suggest that 
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 As the following formula shows, the marginal effect on training (𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) should be added to the marginal effect 
of interactions between high school and training dummies (𝛽𝐻𝑆∗𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) to obtain the overall effect of training. 
 (?̅?𝛽 + 𝛽𝐻𝑆 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  𝛽𝐻𝑆∗𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) − ( ?̅?𝛽 + 𝛽𝐻𝑆) =  𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  𝛽𝐻𝑆∗𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 
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 In delta method, the standard errors of marginal effects are calculated at the means of the explanatory variables.  
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job related training increases the chance of promotion for low educated employees. The 
estimates in Table 1.12 also suggest that women are less likely to receive promotion than men as 
all marginal effects of female dummies in both types of models are negative and statistically 
significant (the likelihood of promotion for women is 2.5% and 2.7% less than for men based on 
logit and RE-logit estimates respectively). The overall effects of training on gender suggest that 
training increases the probability of promotion for women more than for men (6.6% in logit and 
4.4% in RE-logit). 
In Tables 1.13, 1.14, and 1.15, I assess the marginal effects for each promotion level 
separately. The sample in Table 1.13 includes observations only in low level jobs (14,220); the 
sample in Table 1.14 includes the observations in low or middle level jobs (40,605); and Table 
1.15 includes the observation in middle or high level jobs (39,976). These three tables present the 
marginal effects in probability of promotion respectively to middle, high, and executive level 
jobs by using both simple logit and random effects logit models (RE-logit). Columns (1) to (5) 
present the marginal effects and the calculated overall effects are included in columns (6) and (7) 
as Table 1.12. 
The estimates in Table 1.13 show that by fixing other variables, the effects of education 
on the likelihood of promotion to middle level jobs have mixed results. ‘Technical, college, and 
university degree’ holders have the highest chance of this promotion, while graduate holders 
have a low chance compared to the other two education groups. Training affects promotion to 
middle level job by about 10.7% in the RE-logit model.  
Furthermore, the overall effects of training on different education categories prove a 
complement role for training in promotion to middle level jobs when we compare the overall 
effects calculated in columns 6 and 7. That is, the effects of job related training are greater for 
graduate degree holders than less educated employees in promotion to middle level occupations 
(it is 21.7% for graduate degree; 5.2% for technical, college, and university degree; and 3.1% for 
high-school degree holders in column 7). Regarding women and men comparison, men are more 
likely to receive promotion to middle level jobs than women since all marginal effects on female 
dummies are negative and statistically significant. However, training increases the likelihood of 
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promotion for women more than for men in promotion to middle level jobs by 13.3% and 10.1% 
based on logit and RE-logit estimates respectively. 
In Table 1.14, probability of promotion to high level jobs increases with education, but 
training does not have a significant effect on this level of promotion. The results from comparing 
the overall effects of training in RE-logit models do not show a complement role for training in 
this level of promotion since the effects of training on education degrees are not statistically 
significant in both regular logit and RE-logit models. Probability of promotion for men is again 
greater than for women by 1.1% in RE-logit estimates, but training does not show a significant 
difference on the likelihood of promotion of women in this level of promotion. 
Based on the results in Table 1.15, the probability of promotion to executive jobs also 
increases with education, and training does not have a significant effect on this likelihood. The 
overall effects of training on all education degrees are small and insignificant. The results also 
show that the likelihood of promotion for men is slightly greater than the one for women, but 
there is no statistically significant difference in the effects of training on this likelihood. 
These results are robust to two sensitivity analyses presented in appendix D. In Table 
1.22, I include a control variable in the random-effects specifications to indicate whether the 
employee received a promotion in the past. Adding this control variable to the random-effect 
specifications may reduce the potential bias caused by the unobserved heterogeneity affecting the 
likelihood of promotion in the past prior to the current promotion. The random-effect marginal 
effects and levels of their statistical significance are all almost the same as the results in Tables 
1.12, 1.13, 1.14, and 1.15. In Table 1.23, I report the marginal effects from the mixed-effect 
logistic regressions which contain both fixed and random effects. The results are almost the same 
as the random-effects results in Tables 1.13, 1.14, and 1.15. 
1.5.3 Wage Increase Associated with Promotion 
In this section, I investigate how the wage increase due to promotion is affected by a 
worker’s education level and job training. In order to accomplish this, I consider the following 
specifications. 
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𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑇𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿5𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖 +
𝛿6(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿7(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝑇𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿8(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿9(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 ×
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖)+𝛿10𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑡−1𝜑 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝜆 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡−1         𝑖𝑓      𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 1                                              (5)                                            
 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌2𝑇𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌3𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌5𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖 +
𝜌6(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜌7(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝑇𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜌8(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜌9(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 ×
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖)+𝜌10𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝑇𝑡−1𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝜃 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡−1       𝑖𝑓      𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 0                                               (6)                                                                                                                                                                   
 
In regression (5), 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 include all controls in the promotion probability regressions 
except the occupation dummies. Instead of occupation dummies, I include job transition 
dummies in regression (5). These dummies indicate transitions from any occupations at time t-1 
to other occupations at time t. Since both occupations before and after promotion affect the wage 
change, it is important to include the job transition dummies in our model. The error term 𝜖𝑖𝑡−1 
may include a change in beliefs which is a random unobserved factor. In regression (6), 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 
includes the occupation dummies since there are no job transitions when promotion dummy 
equals zero. The error term 𝜈𝑖𝑡−1 includes the unobserved heterogeneity affecting wage changes 
for those who did not get promoted. 
Since a yearly wage increase is usually expected for all job levels even in the absence of 
a promotion, the wage increase due to promotion will be calculated by a difference-in-
differences approach as DeVaro and Waldman (2012) proposes. The wage increase due to 
promotion is the difference between the wage increase a worker receives after promotion 
(equation (5)) relative to what the worker would have received in the absence of a promotion 
(equation (6)). More specifically, I will calculate (𝛿1 − 𝜌1), (𝛿2 − 𝜌2), (𝛿3 − 𝜌3), and (𝛿4 − 𝜌4) 
which are given by (5) minus (6) for four cases of promotion: total promotions, promotion from 
low to middle level jobs, promotion from low or middle to high level jobs, and promotion from 
middle or high to executive level jobs.
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 I first estimate equations (5) and (6) by OLS. Then I 
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 Another way of doing this test is the following three-step method. First, one can estimate regression (6) using the 
observations for which promotion dummy equals zero. Second, by using the estimated coefficients from the first 
step and the observations for which the promotion dummy equals 1, predict a no-promotion wage increase for 
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estimate the random-effect estimations for all promotion levels. The RE estimates for changes in 
log-wage are reported in appendix D, sensibility analysis in Table 1.24, which shows the RE and 
OLS estimates are almost the same. 
1.5.4 Results with respect to Wage Increase Associated with Promotion 
The OLS estimation results of equations (5) and (6) for total promotion, promotion to 
middle level jobs, promotion to high level jobs, and promotion to executive level jobs are 
respectively reported in Tables 1.16, 1.17, 1.18, and 1.19. The samples in columns (1) and (3) of 
these tables include only promoted employees and the samples in columns (2) and (4) include 
non-promoted employees in all job levels. In specifications (3) and (4), the training interaction 
terms are added to the models (1) and (2) respectively. The last two columns present the overall 
effects of training based on columns (3) and (4).  Then, by using the calculated overall effects of 
training, I calculate differences in coefficients and present them at the bottom side of the tables. 
These differences present the effects of variables on the wage increase associated with 
promotion.  
Table 1.16 suggests that the wage increase is higher for more educated employees 
whether they are promoted or not. However, training affects the wage increase positively only 
for people who did not receive promotions, and training effect is statistically insignificant on the 
wage increase for promoted employees. By comparing the differences in marginal effects at the 
bottom side of Table 1.16, one can see that the signs of effects for all levels of education are 
positive and they are higher for more educated employees (with respect to less-than-high-school 
degree holders). That is, as education increases, the wage increase due to promotion increases as 
well. However, only the graduate variable is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result 
does not support what DeVaro and Waldman (2012) find in their paper. They find negative signs 
for coefficients of MA and PhD graduates (with respect to BA degree holders) suggesting that 
wage increase due to promotion decreases with education.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
promoted people. Third, subtract the predicted wage increase in the second step from the actual wage change by 
using the observations for which promotion occurs and obtain the wage increase upon promotion in regression (5). 
Coefficients of the third step of estimation provide us with the effects of education and job related training on wage 
increase upon promotion. 
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The bottom part of Table 1.16 also shows that receiving any job related training does not 
significantly impact the wage increase associated with promotion as none of the differences in 
interaction terms of training and education is statistically significant (except the training and 
graduate degree which is very small close to zero). It also shows that the wage increase due to 
promotion (on general) for women is not statistically different than the one for men, and training 
also does not have a statistically significant effect on this gender difference. 
By looking at the bottom part of Table 1.17, one can see that in a low level promotion 
which is a change from low to middle level jobs, more educated employees have, on average, a 
higher wage increase due to promotion than less educated employees, although none of the 
effects are statistically significant. This is consistent with the results of Table 1.16 that wage 
increase due to promotion increases with education level. Training raises the wage increase due 
to low level promotion for women more than for men, but the effect is insignificant. The 
negative and significant effect of interaction between training and graduate degree level suggests 
that the wage increase associated with promotion to middle level jobs is lower for graduate 
degree holders than the one for less than high school degree holders who receive training, but 
these effects are not statistically significant for all other education degrees. 
The signs of training-education interaction terms are all negative but statistically 
insignificant for differences between the wage increase due to promotion to high and executive 
level jobs respectively presented in bottom parts of the tables 1.18 and 1.19. These findings 
suggest that training does not affect the wage increase corresponding to promotion to high and 
executive level jobs.  
1.6 Conclusion 
A number of studies evaluate the effects of education on promotion, and a few studies 
focus on the effects of job-related training on promotion. However, there is a relative paucity of 
econometric studies which investigate the relative impacts of educational attainment and job-
related training on promotion and corresponding wage increase. Job training might benefit 
employees with higher levels of education if the workers have higher abilities to learn in the 
work place. In this case, job-related training complements the actual educational attainment. On 
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the other hand, training might be a substitute for higher educational attainment if employees with 
lower levels of schooling use job-related training programs to obtain the required skills they did 
not receive through formal education. Understanding the relative impacts of educational 
attainment and job related training on career success is important for government policy in order 
to evaluate whether governments should allocate more resources to higher education or job-
related training. 
This paper contributes to the literature by exploiting an individual level panel data from 
the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). The information available from the GSOEP is 
particularly rich and given the availability of career related and socio-economic data across 
individuals over a number of years, it allows the researcher to assess the long-run effects of 
formal education and job related training. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first 
paper that has employed individual level panel data over time to estimate the relative impacts of 
both education and job related training on promotions and associated wage increase.  
This study finds that the probability of promotion increases with education, and this is 
consistent for promotion to middle, high, and executive levels separately. The results also show 
that the wage increase due to promotion increases with education. The results imply that 
education still plays an important role in the probability of promotion and the associated wage 
increase, which shows a higher productivity level. One policy implication these results suggest is 
that investing in higher education is an efficient decision in terms of increasing the chance of 
promotion and wage growth. 
Moreover, the results show that recent job training increases the probability of promotion 
to middle level jobs, but it has no statistically significant effect on the probability of promotion 
to high or executive level jobs, and no statistically significant effect on wage increase at any 
promotion levels. With respect to the relative effect of job training across education categories, 
training increases the probability of promotion to middle level jobs for graduate degree holders 
more than for lower educated people. This effect is only statistically significant in promotion 
from low to middle level jobs but not for higher level promotions. The policy implication of 
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these results is that investing in the job-related training in low level jobs might increase 
productivity and return to education.  
In promotion to middle level jobs, employees with graduate degree have 21.7%, 
‘technical, college, or university’ degree holders have 5.2% and ‘high school’ degree holders 
have 3.1% more chance of promotion than less than high school degree holders. So in promotion 
to middle level jobs, training complements higher education effect on wage increase associated 
with promotion. However, there are no statistically significant differences between the effects of 
training on wage increase associated with promotions across different education levels in this 
promotion level. 
Regarding differences across genders, the probability of promotion to all job levels is 
higher for men than for women. Also, men are, on average, more likely to receive a greater wage 
increase upon promotion than women. This result is consistent with finding in Busch & Holst 
(2009) that shows the pay is lower for women than for men in all occupations in Germany.
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Further Addison et al (2014) use US data and find that the wage growth associated with 
promotion is higher for men than for women, and that more educated female employees are more 
likely to receive promotions than less educated ones. In this study, I find that training raises the 
probability of promotion to middle level jobs for women more than for men, but there is no 
statistically significant effect of training on promotion to high or executive level for women. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of gender difference in training effects on corresponding wage 
increase upon promotion. 
Taking gender discrimination into account, a model in Lazear & Rosen (1990) state that 
employers set higher promotion standards for their female workers with equal abilities to male 
workers and therefore women are less likely to receive promotion. Milgrom and Oster’s (1987) 
also point that firms hide talented women in low-level jobs and pay them less on average, and as 
a result, female workers are promoted less often than male workers with equal ability and 
education. My findings are consistent with these studies that promotion to all job levels is less 
likely for women than for men, and that women in low level occupations need more training in 
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 They find that wages in typical women’s jobs are lower than wages in typical men’s jobs, and women are paid 
less than men in even typical women’s jobs.  
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addition to their formal education to be promoted to a middle level job. In other words, training 
is more effective for women than men and reduces the promotion gap between two genders in 
promotion to middle level jobs. 
In summary, this research suggests that training has a positive effect on probability of 
promotion to middle level jobs, and training complements higher education only at this 
promotion level. However, there is no evidence of training effect in higher level promotions: 
promotion to high or executive level jobs. The results also point to the importance of job-related 
training for women specifically in low level jobs in order to enhance their productivity and 
likelihood of corresponding promotion. Policy implications of the findings include, first, 
investing in higher education to increase the chance of promotion and associated wage increase 
in all job levels. Second, investing in job-related training programs specifically for women 
increases their chance of promotion and returns to education in low level jobs.  
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1.7 Tables 
 
 
Table 1.1: Definition of three levels of promotions 
Promotion type Definition 
Promotion level 0:  no promotion 
Promotion level 1:  promotion from a low to a middle level job 
Promotion level 2: promotion from a low or middle to a high level job 
Promotion level 3: promotion from a low, middle, or high to an executive level job 
Note: This table provides the definition of no promotion and three promotion levels. 
 
 
Table 1.2: Frequency of individuals in the sample years 
Frequency of individuals 
in each sample year 
Total individuals Total observations  
1988 2,327 2,327 
1989 2,019 4,038 
1990 1,958 5,874 
1992 1,109 4,436 
1993 964 4,820 
1994 1,607 9,642 
1999 454 3,178 
2000 419 3,352 
2001 476 4,284 
2003 238 2,380 
2004 175 1,925 
2005 283 3,396 
2007 107 1,391 
2008 57 798 
2009 180 2,355 
Total 12,373 54,196 
Note: This table presents the number of individuals and total observations in each sample year  
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Table 1.3: Number of trained and promoted individuals in each year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note: This table presents the number of trained and promoted individuals in each survey year. Column three shows the number of  
individuals who received training in the last year, column four presents the number of promoted individuals in the survey year, and  
the fifth column shows the number of promoted individuals who received training in the last year. 
 
Survey year All observations Number of individuals 
who received training 
in the last year  
Number of promoted 
individuals  
Number of promoted 
individuals who received 
training in the last year  
1988 2,496 86 165 7 
1989 2,401 296 148 26 
1990 2,666 161 162 16 
1992 3,843 138 303 18 
1993 3,731 620 274 50 
1994 3,528 265 253 20 
1999 3,140 155 215 10 
2000 3,367 781 200 53 
2001 3,340 103 242 9 
2003 4,638 205 310 11 
2004 4,695 1,142 310 82 
2005 4,461 223 333 15 
2007 3,831 119 269 10 
2008 4,169 866 287 56 
2009 3,890 460 369 46 
Total 54,196 5,620 3,840 429 
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Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics of variables (at t-1) 
 All Workers Female Male 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Female 0.306 0.461     
Age 40.86 10.38 39.45 10.95 41.49 10.06 
Education       
LHS 0.130 0.337 0.157 0.364 0.119 0.323 
HS 0.552 0.497 0.476 0.499 0.586 0.492 
TCU 0.242 0.428 0.292 0.454 0.220 0.414 
GRAD 0.075 0.263 0.076 0.265 0.075 0.263 
Job Related       
Training 0.104 0.305 0.112 0.315 0.101 0.301 
Hourly Income 11.49 4.697 9.264 3.310 12.47 4.881 
Tenure 12.10 9.740 10.52 8.858 12.79 10.03 
Experience 18.35 10.79 15.55 10.26 19.58 10.78 
Job Type       
Blue_collar  0.405 0.491 0.219 0.413 0.487 0.500 
White_collar  0.513 0.500 0.728 0.445 0.417 0.493 
Civil Servant  0.082 0.275 0.053 0.224 0.095 0.293 
Job Level        
Low Level  0.250 0.433 0.321 0.467 0.219 0.413 
Middle Level  0.509 0.500 0.522 0.499 0.504 0.500 
High Level  0.240 0.427 0.157 0.364 0.277 0.447 
Firm Size       
0-20 0.154 0.361 0.177 0.382 0.143 0.351 
21-200 0.281 0.449 0.288 0.453 0.278 0.448 
201-2000 0.270 0.444 0.286 0.452 0.263 0.440 
2000+ 0.295 0.456 0.248 0.432 0.316 0.465 
Promotion (at t)       
Total 0.071 0.257 0.069 0.254 0.072 0.259 
Level 1 0.034 0.181 0.041 0.199 0.031 0.173 
Level 2 0.027 0.163 0.023 0.149 0.029 0.168 
Level 3 0.010 0.100 0.005 0.074 0.012 0.110 
Observations 54,196  17,020 37,176 
Notes- 1) The above samples are obtained from pooling data for 12,373 individuals in 15 cycles of the GSOEP: 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009. 2) LHS: Less than 
High School, HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree.  
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Table 1.5: Distribution of job levels across education levels 
                   (at time t-1 in %) 
 Low-Level  
Job 
Middle-Level  
Job 
High-Level  
Job 
Total 
observations 
 
LHS  65 29 6 7,061 
(100%) 
 
HS   25 61 13 29,945 
(100%) 
 
TCU  10 50 40 13,118 
(100%) 
 
GRAD 2 17 81 4,071 
(100%) 
Notes- 1) This table only considers workers in low, middle and high-level jobs at time t-1.  
Executive level workers at time t-1 are excluded from the sample as they do not have the  
chance of promotion at time t. 2) LHS: Less than High School, HS: High School Degree,  
TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.6: Average promotion rates across education and 
                    promotion levels (at time t in %) 
 Total 
Promotion 
Promotion 
level 1 
Promotion 
level 2 
Promotion 
level 3 
 
LHS  5.8 6.2 1.7 0.3 
 
HS   7.4 16.6 2.8 0.8 
 
TCU  6.8 21.6 5.9 1.1 
 
GRAD 8.3 18.4 23.1 3.6 
Notes- 1) Promotion level 1 is defined as a job change from low to middle level  
jobs, promotion level 2 is a job change from low or middle to high level jobs, and  
promotion level 3 is a job change from any lower levels to executive level jobs.  
2) LHS: Less than high school, HS: High school degree, TCU: Technical, college,  
or university degree, GRAD: Graduate degree. 
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Table 1.7: Average promotion rates across age and promotion levels  
                   (at time t in %) 
 Total 
Promotion 
Promotion 
level 1 
Promotion 
level 2 
Promotion 
level 3 
Total 
observations 
 
Age 20-29  7.8 5.5 1.9 0.3 7,856 
 
Age 30-39   7.7 3.5 3.2 1.1 15,494 
 
Age 40-49  7.0 2.8 3.1 1.2 16,054 
 
Age 50-65 6.3 2.9 2.2 1.2 14,791 
Notes- Promotion level 1 is defined as a job level change from low-level to middle-level jobs,  
promotion level 2 is a job level change form a low-level or middle-level job to a high-level job, and  
promotion level 3 is a job level change from any lower levels to an executive level job.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.8: Distribution of age groups across job levels (at time t-1 in %) 
 Age 20-29 Age 30-39   Age 40-49 Age 50-65 Total 
observations 
 
Low level job 
16.8 23.9 28.2 31.1 13,560 
(100%) 
 
Middle level job 
17.3 29.5 28.3 24.9 27,617 
(100%) 
 
High level job 
6.1 31.5 33.9 28.5 13,020 
(100%) 
Note: This table shows the distribution of different age groups across low, middle, and high level jobs. 
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Table 1.9: Promotion rates for trained and untrained workers across education and 
                   promotion levels (at time t in %) 
Education    Training 
                     Status 
Total 
Promotion 
Promotion 
level 1 
Promotion 
level 2 
Promotion 
level 3 
 
LHS 
 
Trained 11.5 29.5 2.2 0.7 
 
Untrained 5.7 5.8 1.6 0.3 
 
HS 
 
Trained 9.0 29.3 4.9 .9 
 
Untrained 7.3 16 2.6 .8 
 
TCU 
 
Trained 5.9 40.4 5.9 0.9 
 
Untrained 7.0 20.1 5.9 1.2 
 
GRAD 
 
Trained 8.3 55.9 14.7 5.8 
 
Untrained 8.3 16.1 24.6 3.0 
Notes- 1) Promotion level 1 is defined as a job level change from low-level to middle-level jobs, promotion  
level 2 is a job level change form a low-level or middle-level job to a high-level job, and promotion level 3  
is a job level change from any lower levels to an executive level job. 2) LHS: Less than High School,  
HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.10: Average wage growth rate upon promotion across education and promotion levels  
                     (at time t in %, number of observations in parentheses) 
Wage Growth Rate 
(WGR) 
No 
Promotion 
Total 
Promotion 
Promotion 
level 1 
Promotion 
level 2 
Promotion 
level 3 
 
  𝑊𝐺𝑅LHS 
 
2.4 
(7,781) 
 
2.5 
(423) 
 
1.8 
(294) 
 
3.2 
(109) 
 
9.2 
(20) 
 𝑊𝐺𝑅 HS 1.7 
(25,066) 
1.9 
(2,015) 
1.5 
(1,163) 
2.6 
(650) 
2.4 
(202) 
 𝑊𝐺𝑅TCU 1.0 
(12,955) 
2.7 
(1,026) 
4.8 
(349) 
2.0 
(504) 
0.7 
(173) 
 𝑊𝐺𝑅GRAD 1.9 
(4,554) 
3.4 
(376) 
1.0 
(22) 
3.3 
(191) 
3.7 
(163) 
  Notes- LHS: Less than High School, HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree,  
GRAD: Graduate degree. 
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Table 1.11: Average growth rate of wage upon promotion for trained and not trained workers  
                      across education and promotion levels (at time t in %, number of observations in  
                      parentheses) 
Wage Growth Rate  
(𝑊𝐺𝑅) 
No 
Promotion 
Total 
Promotion 
Promotion 
level 1 
Promotion 
level 2 
Promotion 
level 3 
 
𝑊𝐺𝑅LHS 
Trained 2.8 
(188) 
6.1 
(21) 
5.7 
(15) 
5.1 
(5) 
14.9 
(1) 
 
Untrained 2.5 
(7,593) 
2.3 
(402) 
1.5 
(279) 
3.1 
(104) 
8.8 
(19) 
 
 
𝑊𝐺𝑅HS 
Trained 0.8 
(2,186) 
0.9 
(201) 
-0.5 
(93) 
1.4 
(84) 
6.1 
(24) 
 
Untrained 1.8 
(22,880) 
2.1 
(1,814) 
1.7 
(1,070) 
2.8 
(566) 
2.0 
(178) 
 
 
𝑊𝐺𝑅TCU 
Trained 1.9 
(1,971) 
1.9 
(145) 
-1.2 
(42) 
3.1 
(76) 
4.5 
(27) 
 
Untrained 0.9 
(10,984) 
2.8 
(881) 
5.7 
(307) 
1.8 
(428) 
0.2 
(146) 
 
 
𝑊𝐺𝑅GRAD 
Trained 1.9 
(846) 
5.2 
(62) 
2.0 
(5) 
3.8 
(25) 
5.8 
(32) 
 
Untrained 1.9 
(3,708) 
3.0 
(314) 
0.8 
(17) 
3.2 
(166) 
2.8 
(131) 
 
    Notes- LHS: Less than High School, HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree,  
        GRAD: Graduate degree. 
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Table 1.12- Marginal effects of education group and job-related training courses on probability of promotion where the dependent variable is total promotion 
(St.E) 
 
logit   RE-logit  Overall effects of  
training interaction terms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
(4) 
 
(5) 
 logit 
(6) 
RE-logit 
(7) 
      HS .037*** 
(.005) 
.034*** 
(.005) 
.035*** 
(.005) 
 .042*** 
(.004) 
.043*** 
(.004) 
   
      TCU .049*** 
(.006) 
.045*** 
(.006) 
.049*** 
(.007) 
 .063*** 
(.005) 
.066*** 
(.005) 
   
      GRAD .094*** 
(.009) 
.087*** 
(.009) 
.089*** 
(.009) 
 .101*** 
(.007) 
.104*** 
(.007) 
   
      Training .020*** 
(.006) 
.019*** 
(.006) 
.052** 
(.019) 
 .010*** 
(.003) 
.042*** 
(.013) 
   
      Female -.023*** 
(.004) 
-.023*** 
(.004) 
-.025*** 
(.004) 
 -.027*** 
(.003) 
-.027*** 
(.003) 
   
Training    
      
      x  HS   -.031* 
(.020) 
  -.028** 
(.014) 
 .021*** 
(.008) 
.014*** 
(.005) 
      x  TCU   -.054** 
(.021) 
  -.039*** 
(.014) 
 -.002 
(.006) 
.003 
(.006) 
      x  GRAD   -.041* 
(.024) 
  -.042*** 
(.015) 
 .011 
(.014) 
.001 
(.010) 
      x  Female   .014 
(.012) 
  .002 
(.006) 
 .066*** 
(.001) 
.044*** 
(.013) 
Individual-specific dummies 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Job-specific dummies 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
State of residence dummies 
No Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Year dummies 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Constant -.604 
(.575) 
-1.05* 
(.609) 
-1.06* 
(.610) 
 -1.32** 
 (.605) 
-1.36** 
(.606) 
   
Observations 54,196 54,196 54,196  54,196 54,196  54,196 54,196 
   Notes-   1) HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less than High School (reference group).  
                 2) Individual-specific dummies include age, age squared, hourly income, job tenure, job tenure squared, job experience, job experience squared. Job-specific dummies  
                    include the type of job (blue collar, white collar, or civil servant), skill level of job (low, middle, high, executive level job), occupation, industry and firm size. 
                 * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 1.13- Marginal effects of education group and job-related training courses on probability of promotion where the dependent variable is promotion level 1:  
promotion from low to middle level jobs (St.E) 
 logit   RE-logit  Overall effects of  
training interaction terms 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
logit 
(6) 
RE-logit 
 (7) 
       HS .077*** 
(.014) 
.073*** 
(.014) 
.078*** 
(.012) 
 .089*** 
(.010) 
.092*** 
(.010) 
   
      TCU .079*** 
(.035) 
.074*** 
(.033) 
.075*** 
(.016) 
 .103*** 
(.013) 
.105*** 
(.013) 
   
      GRAD .065 
(.085) 
.045 
(.066) 
.040 
(.037) 
 .085*** 
(.038) 
.063* 
(.042) 
   
      Training .073*** 
(.034) 
.068*** 
(.035) 
.146*** 
(.043) 
 .044*** 
(.012) 
.107*** 
(.034) 
   
      Female -.041*** 
(.024) 
-.038*** 
(.023) 
-.037*** 
(.011) 
 -.042*** 
(.009) 
-.042*** 
(.010) 
   
Training          
      x  HS   -.090** 
(.047) 
  -.076** 
(.036) 
 .056** 
(.045) 
.031* 
(.015) 
      x  TCU   -.053 
(.059) 
  -.055* 
(.041) 
 .093** 
(.023) 
.052** 
(.025) 
      x  GRAD   .010 
(.151) 
  .110 
(.111) 
 .156 
(.361) 
..217** 
(.090) 
      x  Female   -.013 
(.033) 
  -.006 
(.023) 
 .133*** 
(.076) 
.101*** 
(.031) 
Individual-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Job-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
State of residence dummies No Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Constant -.755 
(.896) 
-1.29* 
(.933) 
-1.36* 
(.931) 
 -1.77* 
(1.02) 
1.78*** 
(1.02) 
   
Observations 14,220 14,220 14,220  14,220 14,220  14,220 14,220 
    Notes-   1) HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less than High School (reference group).  
                  2) Individual-specific dummies include age, age squared, hourly income, job tenure, job tenure squared, job experience, job experience squared. Job-specific dummies  
                     include the type of job (blue collar, white collar, or civil servant), skill level of job (low, middle, high, executive level job), occupation, industry and firm size. 
                  * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
37 
 
Table 1.14- Marginal effects of education group and job-related training courses on probability of promotion where the dependent variable is promotion level 2:  
promotion from low or middle to high level jobs (St.E) 
 logit   RE-logit  Overall effects of training 
interaction terms  
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
 logit 
 (6) 
RE-logit 
 (7) 
       HS .001 
(.005) 
-.001 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.005) 
 . 002 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
   
      TCU .013** 
(.006) 
.011* 
(.008) 
.012** 
(.006) 
 . 014*** 
(.003) 
.015*** 
(.003) 
   
      GRAD .048*** 
(.007) 
.044*** 
(.026) 
.048*** 
(.007) 
 . 041*** 
(.004) 
.042*** 
(.004) 
   
      Training .005 
(.005) 
.004 
(.008) 
-.006 
(.022) 
 . 002* 
(.002) 
.004 
(.009) 
   
      Female -.013*** 
(.004) 
-.013*** 
(.008) 
-.015*** 
(.004) 
 -.011*** 
(.002) 
-.011*** 
(.002) 
   
Training          
      x  HS   .016 
(.022) 
  .001 
(.009) 
 .01* 
(.006) 
.005** 
(.003) 
      x  TCU   -.003 
(.022) 
  -.006 
(.009) 
 -.009 
(.007) 
-.002 
(.003) 
      x  GRAD   -.024 
(.024) 
  -.009 
(.010) 
 -.03** 
(.024) 
-.005 
(.006) 
      x  Female   .017* 
(.011) 
  .003 
(.004) 
 .011 
(.012) 
.007 
(.009) 
Individual-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Job-specific dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
State of residence dummies No Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Constant -5.16*** 
(.938) 
-5.68*** 
(1.02) 
-5.68*** 
(1.01) 
 -6.14*** 
(.970) 
-6.17*** 
(1.01) 
   
Observations 40,605 40,605 40,605  40,605 40,605  40,605 40,605 
     Notes-    1) HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less than High School (reference group).  
                   2) Individual-specific dummies include age, age squared, hourly income, job tenure, job tenure squared, job experience, job experience squared. Job-specific dummies  
                       include the type of job (blue collar, white collar, or civil servant), skill level of job (low, middle, high, executive level job), occupation, industry and firm size. 
                  * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 1.15- Marginal effects of education group and job-related training courses on probability of promotion where the dependent variable is promotion level 3:  
promotion from middle or high to executive level jobs (St. E) 
 Logit  RE-logit  Overall effects of training 
interaction terms 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
 logit 
(6) 
RE-logit 
 (7) 
       HS .002 
(.004) 
.002 
(.004) 
.002 
(.004) 
 .002 
(.001) 
.002 
(.001) 
   
      TCU .004 
(.004) 
.004 
(.004) 
.005 
(.004) 
 .003** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
   
      GRAD .012*** 
(.005) 
.012*** 
(.005) 
.010** 
(.005) 
 .006*** 
(.002) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
   
      Training .003* 
(.002) 
.003* 
(.002) 
.004 
(.013) 
 .001 
(.001) 
.002 
(.005) 
   
      Female -.003 
(.002) 
-.003 
 (.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
 -.002*** 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
   
Training          
      X  HS   -.003 
(.013) 
  -.0005 
(.005) 
 .001 
(.002) 
.001 
(.420) 
      X  TCU   -.006 
(.013) 
  -.001 
(.005) 
 -.002 
(.004) 
.001 
(.007) 
      X  GRAD   .006 
(.014) 
  -.001 
(.005) 
 .01 
(.013) 
.001 
(.04) 
      X  Female   -.001 
(.006) 
  -.001 
(.001) 
 .003 
(.006) 
.001 
(.031) 
Individual-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Job-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
State of residence dummies No Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Constant -4.47*** 
(1.58) 
-4.61*** 
(1.60) 
-4.57*** 
(1.58) 
 -5.15*** 
(1.57) 
-5.21*** 
(1.58) 
   
Observations 39,976 39,976 39,976  39,976 39,976  39,976 39,976 
     Notes-    1) HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less than High School (reference group).  
                   2) Individual-specific dummies include age, age squared, hourly income, job tenure, job tenure squared, job experience, job experience squared. Job-specific dummies  
                       Include the type of job (blue collar, white collar, or civil servant), skill level of job (low, middle, high, executive level job), occupation, industry and firm size. 
                  * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 1.16 – OLS estimates of change in log-wage for the sample who receives total promotion versus no 
promotions (St.E) 
 Total  
Promotion 
(1) 
No 
Promotions 
(2) 
 Total  
Promotion 
(3) 
No 
Promotions 
(4) 
 Overall effects of training based 
 
on column (3)     on column (4) 
       HS .009 
(.011) 
.007*** 
(.002) 
 .010 
(.012) 
.007*** 
(.002) 
   
      TCU .026** 
(.014) 
.018*** 
(.003) 
 .024* 
(.014) 
.018*** 
(.003) 
   
      GRAD .108*** 
(.019) 
.063*** 
(.005) 
 .109*** 
(.021) 
.065*** 
(.005) 
   
      Training .009 
(.010) 
.011*** 
(.003) 
 .014 
(.048) 
.029*** 
(.012) 
   
      Female -.033*** 
(.009) 
-.040*** 
(.002) 
 -.033*** 
(.010) 
-.040*** 
(.002) 
   
Training         
     x  HS    -.019 
(.049) 
-.019* 
(.012) 
 -.005 
(.069) 
.010*** 
(.017) 
     x  TCU    .010 
(.049) 
-.014 
(.012) 
 .024* 
(.069) 
.015*** 
(.017) 
     x  GRAD    -.011 
(.052) 
-.026** 
(.013) 
 .004 
(.071) 
.004 
(.018) 
     x  Female    .006 
(.020) 
-.001 
(.005) 
 .021 
(.052) 
.028*** 
(.013) 
Constant .077 
(.080) 
.174*** 
(.020) 
 .076 
(.080) 
.173*** 
(.020) 
   
Individual-
specific 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Occupation 
dummies 
No Yes  No Yes    
Job transition 
dummies 
Yes No  Yes No    
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Observations 3,840 50,356  3,840 50,356  3,840 50,356 
Differences in coefficients (wage increase due to promotion) 
HS .003 
(.012) 
 Training x  HS 
                
-.015 
(.071) 
TCU .006 
(.014) 
 Training x  TCU 
                
.009 
(.071) 
GRAD .044** 
(.021) 
 Training x  GRAD 
                
.0001* 
(.073) 
Training -.015 
(.049) 
 Training x  Female 
                
-.007 
(.054) 
Female .007 
(.010) 
         
Notes- 1) HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less 
than High School (reference group).  
2) Individual-specific dummies include age, age squared, hourly income, job tenure, job tenure squared, job experience, job 
experience squared. Job-specific dummies include the type of job (blue collar, white collar, or civil servant), skill level of job 
(low, middle, high, executive level job), occupation, industry and firm size. 
         * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 1.17 – OLS estimates of change in log-wage for the sample who receives promotion level 1, from low to  
                       middle level  jobs versus no promotions (St.E) 
 Promotion 
Level 1 
 (1) 
No 
Promotions 
(2) 
 Promotion 
Level 1 
 (3) 
No 
Promotions 
(4) 
 Overall effects of training 
based 
 
on column (3)  on column (4) 
       HS .018 
(.013) 
.006* 
(.004) 
 .023* 
(.013) 
.006* 
(.004) 
   
      TCU .029* 
(.017) 
.010* 
(.006) 
 .031* 
(.018) 
.010 
(.007) 
   
      GRAD .065 
(.045) 
.013 
(.029) 
 .083* 
(.051) 
.008 
(.029) 
   
      Training .0003 
(.016) 
.020** 
(.009) 
 .073 
(.049) 
.021 
(.019) 
   
      Female -.048*** 
(.011) 
-.063*** 
(.004) 
 -.049*** 
(.012) 
-.063*** 
(.005) 
   
Training         
     x  HS    -.091* 
(.048) 
-.0001 
(.020) 
 -.018 
(.069) 
.021* 
(.028) 
     x  TCU    -.063 
(.051) 
.015 
(.034) 
 .010 
(.071) 
.036 
(.039) 
     x  GRAD    -.146* 
(.071) 
.197*** 
(.018) 
 -.074 
(.120) 
.219*** 
(.050) 
     x  Female    .009 
(.052) 
-.012 
(.013) 
 .081* 
(.058) 
.009 
(.026) 
Constant .148* 
(.106) 
.217*** 
(.043) 
 .147* 
(.106) 
.217*** 
(.043) 
   
Individual-
specific 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Occupation 
dummies 
No Yes  No Yes    
Job transition 
dummies 
Yes No  Yes No    
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Observations 1,828 12,392  1,828 12,392  1,828 12,392 
Differences in coefficients (wage increase due to promotion) 
HS .017 
(.014) 
 Training x  HS 
                
-.039 
(.074) 
TCU .020 
(.019) 
 Training x  TCU 
                
.026 
(.081) 
GRAD .075 
(.059) 
 Training x  GRAD 
                
-.293** 
(.130) 
Training .052 
(.052) 
 Training x  Female 
                
.072 
(.063) 
Female .014 
(.013) 
         
Notes- 1) HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less 
than High School (reference group). 2) Individual-specific dummies include age, age squared, hourly income, job tenure, job 
tenure squared, job experience, job experience squared. Job-specific dummies include the type of job (blue collar, white collar, or 
civil servant), skill level of job (low, middle, high, executive level job), occupation, industry and firm size. 
         * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 1.18 – OLS estimates of change in log-wage for the sample who receives promotion level 2, from low or  
                       middle to high level jobs versus no promotions (St.E) 
 Promotion 
Level 2 
 (1) 
No 
Promotions 
(2) 
 Promotion 
Level 2 
(3) 
No 
Promotions 
(4) 
 Overall effects of training 
based 
 
on column (3) on column (4) 
       HS -.003 
(.023) 
.011*** 
(.002) 
 -.011 
(.022) 
.012*** 
(.002) 
   
      TCU -.014 
(.027) 
.020*** 
(.003) 
 -.024 
(.027) 
.020*** 
(.003) 
   
      GRAD .043* 
(.032) 
.055*** 
(.008) 
 .035  
(.033) 
.055*** 
(.009) 
   
      Training .011 
(.017) 
.014*** 
(.003) 
 -.160 
(.130) 
.030*** 
(.012) 
   
      Female -.026* 
(.016) 
-.052*** 
(.002) 
 -.028* 
(.017) 
-.052*** 
(.003) 
   
Training         
     x  HS    .169 
(.134) 
-.022* 
(.012) 
 .009 
(.187) 
.008* 
(.017) 
     x  TCU    .177* 
(.132) 
-.012 
(.013) 
 .017 
(.185) 
.018*** 
(.018) 
     x  GRAD    .171 
(.135) 
-.016 
(.019) 
 .011 
(.187) 
.013 
(.022) 
     x  Female    .010 
(.031) 
.004 
(.007) 
 -.149 
(.134) 
.034*** 
(.014) 
Constant .045 
(.148) 
.191*** 
(.023) 
 .062 
(.149) 
.191*** 
(.023) 
   
Individual-
specific 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Occupation 
dummies 
No Yes  No Yes    
Job transition 
dummies 
Yes No  Yes No    
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Observations 1,454 39,151  1,454 39,151  1,454 39,151 
Differences in coefficients (wage increase due to promotion) 
       HS -.023 
(.022) 
 Training x  HS 
                
.001 
(.188) 
      TCU -.044 
(.027) 
 Training x  TCU 
                
-.001 
(.186) 
      GRAD -.020 
(.034) 
 Training x  GRAD 
                
-.002 
(.188) 
      Training -.190 
(.130) 
 Training x  Female 
                
-.183 
(.135) 
      Female . 024 
(.017) 
         
Notes- 1) HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less 
than High School (reference group). 2) Individual-specific dummies include age, age squared, hourly income, job tenure, job 
tenure squared, job experience, job experience squared. Job-specific dummies include the type of job (blue collar, white collar, or 
civil servant), skill level of job (low, middle, high, executive level job), occupation, industry and firm size. 
         * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 1.19 – OLS estimates of change in log-wage for the sample who receives promotion level 3, from middle     
                       or high to executive level jobs versus no promotions (St.E) 
 Promotion 
Level 3 
(1) 
No 
Promotions 
(2) 
 Promotion 
Level 3 
(3) 
No 
Promotions 
(4) 
 Overall effects of training 
based 
 
on column (3)  on column(4) 
       HS -.100* 
(.071) 
.004 
(.004) 
 -.111* 
(.075) 
.006* 
(.004) 
   
      TCU -.096* 
(.071) 
.015*** 
(.004) 
 -.105* 
(.076) 
.015*** 
(.004) 
   
      GRAD .006 
(.078) 
.058*** 
(.005) 
 .004  
(.084) 
.060*** 
(.006) 
   
      Training .029 
(.026) 
.009*** 
(.003) 
 -.119 
(.128) 
.028** 
(.015) 
   
      Female -.003* 
(.033) 
-.039*** 
(.002) 
 -.006* 
(.036) 
-.039*** 
(.003) 
   
Training         
     x  HS    .176* 
(.133) 
-.022* 
(.015) 
 .057 
(.185) 
.007* 
(.021) 
     x  TCU    .152 
(.134) 
-.017 
(.015) 
 .033 
(.185) 
.011*** 
(.021) 
     x  GRAD    .113 
(.122) 
-.028* 
(.016) 
 -.005 
(.177) 
.0004 
(.022) 
     x  Female    .037 
(.070) 
.002 
(.006) 
 -.082 
(.146) 
.031** 
(.016) 
Constant .541** 
(.261) 
.163*** 
(.024) 
 .551** 
(.273) 
.161*** 
(.024) 
   
Individual-
specific 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Occupation 
dummies 
No Yes  No Yes    
Job transition 
dummies 
Yes No  Yes No    
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes    
Observations 531 39,445  531 39,445  531 39,445 
Differences in coefficients (wage increase due to promotion) 
       HS -.117 
(.075) 
 Training x  HS 
                
.050 
(.186) 
      TCU -.120 
(.076) 
 Training x  TCU 
                
.022 
(.186) 
      GRAD -.056 
(.084) 
 Training x  GRAD 
                
-.005 
(.178) 
      Training -.147 
(.128) 
 Training x  Female 
                
-.113 
(.147) 
      Female .033 
(.036) 
         
 Notes- 1) HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less 
than High School (reference group). 2) Individual-specific dummies include age, age squared, hourly income, job tenure, job 
tenure squared, job experience, job experience squared. Job-specific dummies include the type of job (blue collar, white collar, or 
civil servant), skill level of job (low, middle, high, executive level job), occupation, industry and firm size. 
 * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Chapter 2. The effects of a reduction in Unemployment Insurance duration on the 
likelihood of joining welfare: Evidence from Germany 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Concerns about the effects of a less generous UI system on post-unemployment outcomes 
have been increasingly expressed by policy-makers and controversially discussed by many 
studies over the past few decades (Fortin et al. 1999, Pellizzari 2006, Amable and Francon 
2014). Search theoretic models suggest that a generous UI system increases the reservation 
wage, thereby creating disincentives for the unemployed to look actively for jobs. A higher 
reservation wage and reduced work incentive might lead to a longer unemployment for the 
unemployed who wait for better job offers. In a longer unemployment, individuals are more 
likely to join a welfare program after using UI benefits since they would need to rely on their 
savings after the benefit period ends. Therefore, a more generous UI program may increase the 
length of unemployment and the likelihood of joining welfare.  
Conversely, a policy that shortens the length of UI benefit would decrease the reservation 
wage, and increase the work incentive and likelihood of finding a job for the unemployed. That 
is, a less generous UI program encourages a faster return to the job market that makes the 
unemployed less likely to need welfare a short time after using UI benefits. Thus, a policy that 
reduces amount or duration of UI benefits could decrease the chance of using welfare for UI 
recipients. The reaction of unemployed people to any changes in UI benefits could depend on the 
availability of the alternative welfare programs (Pellizzari 2006). For instance, a reduction in UI 
benefits might not significantly affect the likelihood of job finding if the welfare benefit is easily 
available as an alternative source of income for the unemployed people. In addition, any policy 
affecting UI eligibility conditions may also impact the likelihood of joining welfare programs. 
For example, once the number of required working hours to be eligible for UI benefits increases, 
the unemployed who do not have enough insured hours would apply for welfare instead. 
Many studies have investigated the effects of UI benefit and its characteristics on 
unemployment duration and probability of exiting unemployment. Some studies such as Katz 
and Meyer (1990), Hunt (1995), Card and Levine (2000) suggest that higher amount of UI 
benefits is associated with longer unemployment spells. A few studies such as Pellizzari (2006) 
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and Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) find no relationship between the generosity of UI benefits 
and unemployment duration.  
Analyzing the effects of a longer UI benefit is also important in terms of post-
unemployment job quality or stability. Theory is that if an individual has more supported time to 
search, they can find a better job match. Empirical evidence on this topic is mixed in the 
literature. Many studies find a positive correlation between a long benefit duration and job 
stability or job quality because a longer UI benefit may increase the likelihood of finding a right 
matched employment (Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), Acemoglu and Shiner (2000), Tatsiramos 
(2009), Caliendo et al (2013)). However, some other studies such as Addison and Blackburn 
(2000), Card et al (2007), Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) find weak or no effects of benefit 
duration on job stability or quality. Even if a longer unemployment increases the chance of more 
stable jobs, the UI program structure could be improved to reduce incentives for lengthy spells of 
unemployment (moral hazard problem).  
For a long time, a policy concern has been how to modify UI conditions to reduce the 
negative effects of UI but still provide a protection for the unemployed and assist them return to 
the job market. For example, providing Social assistance (SA) to those who exhaust their UI is 
one option. Analyzing the effect of UI on joining a welfare program is also crucial from a 
political perspective specifically when two programs are run by two different levels of 
government. Any modifications in one program may increase the cost of other one in the other 
level of government. For instance, UI (EI) in Canada is run by the federal government, while SA 
is under the provincial jurisdictions.  Therefore, given two governmental programs, analyzing the 
impacts of one program on the other one may suggest a comprehensive reform to both programs 
rather than separate reforms.  
In my study, the Hartz reforms in Germany enable me to analyze the effects of UI 
duration change on the likelihood of joining welfare program in Germany before and after the 
reforms. My study will add to the literature in two ways: First, this study estimates the likelihood 
of joining welfare after using UI benefits in Germany. Second, I investigate the effects of a 
reduction in UI generosity, following the Hartz reforms, on the probability of joining welfare for 
UI recipients by using the method of difference-in-differences. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the main results of the literature 
that focuses on the effects of UI and welfare programs. Section III summarizes the Hartz reforms 
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and welfare programs in Germany. Methodology is discussed in section IV, and dataset and 
variables are explained in section V. Section VI presents a descriptive analysis on UI claimants 
joining welfare within a few years after their UI use. Estimation results are presented in section 
VII, the sensitivity analyses are provided in sections VIII and the final section concludes the 
study. Tables, appendices and references are provided at the end of the paper.  
2.2 Related Literature Review 
Nickell (1979) and Lancaster (1979) initially showed that more generous UI benefits 
increase the length of unemployment spells. The positive relationship between the generosity of 
UI and length of unemployment has been confirmed by other studies in the literature. Katz and 
Meyer (1990) also use the UI institutional changes for the US and also find that if the UI benefit 
period increases, the unemployment duration raises too. Hunt (1995) also finds similar results for 
older workers aged 44-48 using the GSOEP. However, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2009) use the 
administrative data from Germany and find no relationship between UI generosity and 
unemployment duration. They suggest that there is no systematic relation between the 
unemployment hazard rate and the institutional changes in UI benefits.  
Although there are numerous empirical studies on UI or other social programs separately, 
the effects of one program on the other programs have not been very well discussed in the 
literature, and only a few studies take the two programs into account while analyzing the impact 
of each. A notable exception is Fortin, Lacroix, and Thilbault (1999) that study the effect of UI 
generosity on welfare participation. They use the database of SA records in Quebec to create a 
measure of UI generosity which is calculated based on the minimum number of working weeks 
required to qualify for UI and the maximum number of benefit weeks. More specifically, Fortin 
et al. (1999) argue that as the maximum number of UI benefit weeks decreases, some UI users 
will be pushed into the SA program. Also, some UI single mothers may be qualified for both UI 
and SA simultaneously since their income from UI benefits falls below the income threshold for 
the SA program.
28
 However, Grey (2002) reports that simultaneous usage of both programs at 
                                                     
28
 Their data include 95,514 claimants of which 92% are single mothers who received social assistance at least once 
between 1979 and 1993. They created a measure of the UI generosity by calculating a ratio which represents the 
maximum number of weeks an eligible claimant may receive benefits divided by the minimum number of working 
weeks required to qualify for UI. They estimate the effect of this variable on exit rate from welfare in a proportional 
hazard function and conclude that decreasing UI benefits and tightening UI eligibility conditions are associated with 
a longer stay in welfare. Fortin et al. (1999) also examine the impact of other parameters on exit from and re-entry 
 46 
 
the same time is very unlikely, and there is a substantial lag between exhausting UI and entering 
welfare since many UI exhaustees hold some assets or have relatives who earn income. Based on 
Grey’s results, people are ineligible to receive the welfare support immediately after using their 
UI. Therefore, joining a welfare program may happen in a longer time period after the usage of 
UI benefits. Since there are no UI reforms in Grey’s data set, he is not able to address the effects 
of UI modifications on the likelihood of joining welfare, while the UI change in the Germany 
Hartz reforms in Germany enables me to use the difference-in-differences methodology and 
distinguish the effects of a policy change on the chance of joining welfare in different time 
frames. 
The reaction of unemployed people to a reduction in UI benefits seems to depend on the 
availability of alternative welfare programs. Pellizzari (2006) shows that a reduction in UI 
benefits might not significantly affect the likelihood of job finding if the SA benefit is easily 
available as an alternative source of income for the unemployed people because people substitute 
SA benefits for their exhausted UI benefits.
29
 However, he states that the elasticity of job-finding 
probability relative to the UI benefit is higher for households who are qualified for means-tested 
family benefits rather than for those who have access to universal benefits.
30
 The mutual effects 
of income support programs highlight the importance of a comprehensive reform in labour 
market policies versus the separate program reforms.  
Regarding a comprehensive reform, the Hartz plan in Germany is a great example that 
affects many labour market policies and programs in Germany. The effects of UI policy change 
in the Hartz reforms are specifically focused on old people. The reforms phase out the early 
retirement options for older people and encourage them to continue working. As a result, early 
retirement has become less incentive after the reforms and more workers in the retirement age 
group stay employed and do not enter unemployment. Dlugosz et al (2009) show that the 
reduced UI entitlement length provides disincentives to enter unemployment for older people 
                                                                                                                                                                           
into SA and find that more educated and younger claimants exit welfare more rapidly and are less likely to re-enter 
welfare.  
 
29
 He uses monthly labour market histories of individuals from all 15 pre-enlargement EU countries from the 
European Community Household Panel to show that the reaction to UI benefit change depends on the benefit type of 
an SA program.  
 
30
 Universal family benefits are the benefits allocated to the families in need based on the number and age of their 
children, but there is no condition on the level of income in this type of benefits. On the contrary, the means-tested 
benefits will be paid to the families who demonstrate that the level of their income is below a specified threshold.  
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who are close to their retirement age. That is, the reform keeps them employed and prevents 
them from entering into unemployment. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that UI users close 
to their retirement age become less likely to be a welfare user since they have more incentives to 
stay employed because of a less incentive retirement benefit option. 
Regarding the effects of the Hartz reforms, Amable and Francon (2014) is one of the 
most recent studies to investigate the effect of reforms on the exit rate from unemployment and 
some post-unemployment outcomes.
31
 Their results indicate that the Hartz reform cut in UI 
benefit duration has decreased unemployment duration for 45-49 and 55-59 age groups. They 
also investigate the effects of reforms on three post-unemployment outcomes: job stability, skill 
adequacy, and type of contract. They find that a reduction in UI benefit decreases the post-
unemployment job quality.  
Although different post-unemployment outcomes have been analyzed in the literature, 
there is no enough research on joining a welfare program as a post-unemployment outcome after 
using UI benefits. The UI users might end up with welfare benefits if the UI program is not 
effective in returning the unemployed to the job market. Whether a reduction in UI benefits 
increases or reduces the chance of joining a welfare program is the main question of this study. I 
specifically analyze the effect of a UI benefit cut implemented by the 2006 Hartz reforms on this 
likelihood in Germany.  
2.3 Hartz Reforms and Institutional Background 
UI as a social program in Germany, as in many other countries, provides temporary 
financial help to the unemployed individuals who contributed to the program by paying UI 
insurance premium, while they were employed.
32
 Governments usually determine the UI 
insurance premium based on the average expected loss for the entire labor force and use this 
program as an income redistribution tool. On the other hand, Social Assistance (SA) as one of 
                                                     
31
 They use a sample of 7,846 unemployment spells from the GSOEP and estimate the unemployment-to-
employment hazard rates for treated and control groups using a difference-in-difference method. The treatment 
group is categorized into different age groups and the model is estimated by a Cox-Partial Likelihood method to 
specify a flexible distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. The demographic variables in their model include age, 
sex, marital status, nationality, categories for the highest obtained education degree; the number of UI spells prior to 
the current one, year dummies and a dummy for East Germans. 
 
32
 The expression Hilfe zur selbsthilfe (help people to help yourself) has been used in Germany to show the goal of 
UI and similar programs.  
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the welfare programs in Germany also provides financial assistance to people who are in 
financial need with little or no income. There is no need for contribution to the SA program 
unlike the UI program, but the household income level must be below the program threshold to 
receive the benefits. 
The Hartz reforms or Hartz plan
33
 is a set of structural German labour market reforms 
prepared between 2003 and 2005 by the Committee for Modern Services. These reforms 
involved four packages, Hartz I-IV, constituting a comprehensive modification of German labour 
market policies implemented over 2003-2005.
34
 The main goals of these reforms were to 
improve employment services, decrease unemployment, and increase incentives for re-
employment of the unemployed. The reforms modified the organizational structure of public 
employment services and several measures of Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP). 
Furthermore, the UI benefit system and rights and responsibilities of the unemployed were 
restructured. The last Hartz package (IV) implemented in January 2005 involved a decrease in 
UI benefit generosity.
35
  
Germany had three programs to support the unemployed before the Hartz reforms. The 
first one is the UI program (Arbeitslosengeld I) which was earnings-related benefits for the 
unemployed who had contributions to the program from past job experience. Anyone who has 
been employed, contributed to the UI program for 12 months, and become unemployed is 
eligible to apply for the UI benefits. The minimum qualifying period is 12 months for people 
aged between 15 and 64. These benefits are payable monthly between 90 to 360 days depending 
on the length of insured employment and age. If the unemployed had worked for two years or 
more they will receive a full year’s UI benefits. 
Unemployment Assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) was another program designed to support 
the unemployed before the Hartz reforms. This program was an earnings-related benefit, which 
needed contribution, for the unemployed who exhausted their UI benefits but still needed 
assistance to find jobs.  Social Assistance (Sozialhilfe) was a means-tested benefit before the 
reforms and it was paid to the unemployed who did not have any entitlements to the UI benefits. 
                                                     
33
 The Hartz committee was in the name of its chairman, Peter Hartz. 
 
34
 The Hartz reforms were implemented in January 2003 (Hartz I and II), 2004 (Hartz III), and 2005 (Hartz IV). 
 
35
 The German public social expenditure was about 27.3% of GDP in 1998. Only Denmark, France, Switzerland and 
Sweden spending was more than Germany (at 31%) as Adema et al (2003) reports. 
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The minimum amount of SA benefit is about 350 euros per month depending on the savings, 
spouse's earnings and life insurance. 
The Hartz IV reform merged the Unemployment Assistance and Social Assistance 
programs to create a single new assistance program UI II (Arbeitslosengeld II) which requires an 
active job search. The new assistance program offers a flat-rate means-tested benefit which is 
significantly less than the total benefits paid under two previous programs. The modifications of 
UI structure in Hartz IV consists of a reduction in the number of years prior to unemployment to 
calculate the required working hours and contribution to the program.
36
  
Under the new program, there is no geographical limit on job search for the unemployed 
who do not have familial ties and can move easily across cities. The unemployed also need to 
provide proof that a job is not suitable if they do not accept it. As a result of the reforms, the 
maximum benefit duration for the unemployed above 45 years old was reduced, but the amount 
of benefit was not changed. The longer benefit duration for this age group before the reform was 
a bridge to early retirement as firms could use it and negotiate dismissals for less productive 
older workers. Table 2.1 compares the main differences among eligibility conditions for social 
assistance, unemployment assistance, and unemployment benefit II before and after the Hartz 
reforms as Königs (2014) present. As Table 2.1 shows, individuals who had insufficient 
contribution for unemployment benefits before the Hartz reforms could apply for social 
assistance (Sozialhilfe) if their income and assets were below a specified minimum threshold and 
were available to work as a part-time or full-time employee. Unlike Social Assistance, claiming 
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosengeld), before the Hartz reforms, needs a contribution to 
UI I. When an unemployment insurance user exhausts her UI benefits but she still needs 
assistance to find a job, she may apply for the unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosengeld). 
After the Hartz reforms, social assistance (Sozialhilfe) still belongs to people who have 
insufficient contribution to UI I with income and assets below a threshold, but they are incapable 
of working. People who have the first two conditions and are able and available for at least pert-
time jobs are the ones who can apply for unemployment benefits II (Arbeitslosengeld II). 
Amable and Francon (2014) summarize modifications in UI duration cut presented in Table 2.2 
as a result of the reform among different age groups.  
                                                     
36
 Number of years is now two rather than three years.  
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2.4 Data and Methodology 
I employ the Cox-proportional hazard model and difference-in-differences (DID) and 
investigate the probability of joining welfare for people who have used UI benefits before versus 
after the Hartz reforms. The DID method aims to measure the causal effect of a less generous UI 
program on the likelihood of joining welfare. By this method, I measure the difference between 
the hazard ratios of joining welfare for a treatment versus a control group after they experience 
UI benefits. In this study, the UI recipients who are 45-60 year-old individuals are the initial 
treatment group and 30-44 year-old UI recipients are the initial control group because the Hartz 
reforms apply the UI change policy only on 45 year-old individuals. 
To identify the impact of UI duration change in the 2006 Hartz reforms on the likelihood 
of UI benefit recipients who join welfare, I use a sample of UI benefit recipients from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) over 2002-2009. The sample consists of 30 to 60 year-
old unemployed people, reporting a labour force status of “registered unemployed” that are 
receiving benefits. These unemployed people are either heads of household or their partners in 
the household. I keep those individuals whose household income deducted by individual income 
is less than the welfare threshold. The welfare threshold is calculated for different household 
size. The data is a panel and some individuals have multiple UI spells. Among all the UI 
recipients who join welfare before and after the reforms, 96% join within less than three years, 
45% have multiple UI spells, and 52% have multiple transitions to welfare. For instance, if 
someone has two UI spells, one in 2002 and one in 2007, the transition dummy for this 
individual would take value one for each transition if she joins welfare after each of her two UI 
spells. To consider the multiple UI spells in my analysis and distinguish between UI users who 
experience only one spell or those with multiple UI, I use a multiple spell indicator following 
Curtis and Rybczynski (2014). 
The critical eligibility condition for welfare benefits is that an individual’s household 
income level must be below a required threshold. Some people may exhaust their UI benefits and 
then apply for welfare, and some others may use both benefits at the same time if UI benefits do 
not raise the household income above the threshold. Thus, I restrict the sample further to include 
only potential welfare recipients among the UI recipients whose annual household income is less 
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than the welfare threshold regardless of their annual individual income.
37
 This sample restriction 
enables us to keep the individuals who might be potential welfare users in the sample.  
I include a policy dummy variable for the post-reform period from 2006 to 2009. Because 
some respondents drop out of or join the sample during these periods, the panels are unbalanced. 
People at the end of the sample are right-censored if they have used UI benefits but have not 
transitioned to welfare as of 2009. So people at the end of the sample who did not have enough 
time to transition to welfare are censored.
38
 I also count those observations who are ineligible to 
receive welfare as censored because their household income is above the welfare threshold. 
Excluding spells with missing information on UI characteristics and welfare variables, the main 
sample includes 2,404 spells. Of the main sample, 1,153 spells are in the control group and 1,251 
spells are in the treatment group. 
The following Cox-proportional model, which is a function in time and a function in 
covariates, estimates the hazard ratio of joining a welfare spell at year t for the treatment group 
versus control group, conditional on using UI benefits up to and including t.  
𝜆(𝑡) = 𝜆0(𝑡) ∗ exp [𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋]                          (1) 
The baseline hazard rate,λ0(t), is non-parametric, placing no restrictions on duration 
dependence.
39
 Hartz is a dummy variable taking a value of one for the UI users who have 
received UI benefits between 2006 and 2009. The dummy variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 indicates the treatment 
group specifying the UI recipients who are 45-60 year-old. The interaction term between dummy 
variables Hartz and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 is the average treatment effect. The estimated exp (𝛽12) gives the 
average treatment effect which is the hazard ratio of joining welfare for treatment group versus 
control group. The mathematical calculation of this hazard ratio or DID is described in appendix 
C.  
The variable X includes other covariates to estimate the hazard rates of UI users joining 
welfare. It includes age, gender, education, household size, number of children in the household, 
job experience, number of months in UI and amount of UI benefits in the last unemployment 
                                                     
37
 I keep the individuals in the sample if their household income deducted by individual income is less than the 
welfare threshold. The welfare threshold is calculated for different household size and deflated to 2009. 
 
38
 In sensitivity analysis, I consider both UI recipients at the end of panel 1 (2006) and the ones at the end of panel 2 
(2009) as right-censored groups and then re-estimate the model. The results are still consistent. 
 
39
 The hazard rate of joining welfare after using UI benefits is discussed mathematically in appendix B. 
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spell, and a multiple UI spell indicator. Four dummy variables of education categories are 
defined  based on the years of education. I use the structure of the German education system and 
define four education levels: less than high school (LHS); high school degree (HS); technical, 
college, or university degree (TCU); and graduate degree (GRAD). The German education 
system and definition of these four education variables are summarized in Appendix B of chapter 
1. 
I estimate equation (1) on the base sample where the age group of 45-60 year-old UI 
users is the treatment group, who were affected by a reduction in benefit duration following the 
Hartz reforms, whereas the 30-44 year-old claimants are the unaffected users. However, a 
potential problem with the treatment group aged 45-60 is that other factors unrelated to the new 
UI policy might affect the hazard rates of 45-60 year-old users relative to the younger UI 
claimants. For instance, the pension benefits for the people who are close to their retirement age 
at 65, may impact the likelihood of joining welfare. Also, the young population who are close to 
the age of 20 are the newcomers to the job market and might still be under the support of 
families.
40
 Therefore, I conduct a sensitivity analysis using age groups, 35-44 and 45-54 that will 
have more similarities in their characteristics. 
2.5 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics of variables used in this study are presented in Table 2.3. This table 
compares the mean and standard deviations of all variables for the whole sample (age 30-60), 
control group (age 30-44), and treatment group (age 45-60). The table shows that the treatment 
group (45-60 years-old UI users) includes 52% observations of the whole sample. On average, 
46% of the whole sample are women and more than 53% hold a high school degree in both 
control and treatment groups. The control group has on average 11 years of job experience, 
whereas the treatment group, who are older and more experienced UI users, have 24 years of 
labour market experience. Comparing the individual labour income of both groups, income is 
slightly higher in the control group (10,434 euros) than for the treatment group (9,199 euros). 
The average household income is almost equal for the two groups (approximately $28,300).   
                                                     
40
 To avoid the problem of including too young and too old population in the sample and to choose the best 
treatment and control groups, I compare the distribution of variables for different age cohorts among the 20-65 year-
old UI receivers over 2002-2006.  
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Regarding the family size, three people live on average in a family including one child at 
home. Table 2.3 also presents the statistics of UI spells for three samples. The average number of 
months for last year UI spell is 5.6 months for control group, while this average is higher for the 
treatment group, 7.2 months. The average amounts of benefits for the last UI spell is also higher 
for the treatment group ($5,743) than for the control group ($4,103). 
 Based on the table, 29% of the whole sample join welfare (31% of the control group and 
26% of the treatment group), and 17% are right-censored. Before estimating the hazard ratio of 
joining welfare, I present the percentages of UI users who join welfare in the following years 
after they receive their UI benefits. Table 2.4 presents the frequency table of UI users joining 
welfare within three years of UI benefits. On average, 60% of UI users join welfare at the same 
year of UI, 32% following the first year, and 8% following subsequent years. Multiple UI spells 
and multiple transitions to welfare are presented in Table 2.5. Among all UI users, 55% have 
single UI spells and 45% receive UI more than once. Also, among the UI users who join welfare, 
48% join welfare one time, whereas 52% of them join welfare in multiple times.  
Comparison of percentages of UI users who join welfare between control and treatment 
groups before and after the Hartz reforms are presented in Table 2.6. Almost 22% of the control 
group and 17% of the treatment group join welfare before the Hartz reform. These percentages 
decrease to 10% and 8% after the reforms for control and treatment groups respectively. 
Calculations in this table are based on the raw data without controlling for any factors. The 
difference-in-differences of these percentages is 30% that suggests a reduction in UI benefit 
weeks increases the percentage of joining welfare by 30% for those affected by the policy 
change, the 45-60 year-old UI users. In the absence of the policy effect, I would have expected 
no differences between the ratios of joining for two groups of UI users. Thus, a positive raw DID 
suggest that the implemented policy would increase the hazard rate of joining welfare.  
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 also illustrate the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard rates for two 
control and treatment groups before and after the Hartz reforms. Figure 2.1 displays the hazard 
rates before and after the reforms for control group (aged 30-44) and figure 2.2 displays them for 
the treatment group (aged 45-60). By comparing these two figures, I can observe the potential 
reform impact at different stages of durations. The reform impact can be measured by comparing 
the differences in hazard rates of both figures. As it is shown in figures, the post-reform hazard 
rate trends are below the pre-reform trends for both groups. This finding suggests that the 
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likelihood of joining a welfare program is decreased after the reforms for all age groups. 
However, the reduction in hazard rates for treatment group is less than the one for control group 
suggesting that the Hartz reform has increased the chance of joining welfare for the treatment 
group. In the next step, I estimate the hazard rates of joining welfare by using equation (1) in the 
previous section to find the treatment effect of Hartz reforms on the hazard rates and find out if 
the estimation result is consistent with these graph findings. 
2.6 Estimation Results 
In Table 2.7, I report the estimation results of the Cox-proportional hazard model in 
equation (1) for the pooled, female, and male samples separately. The hazard rates are presented 
for two specifications. In specification 1, I control for the observed characteristics of UI users in 
the year of UI use. The state of residence and UI-year fixed effects are also included in this 
specification. In specification 2, I add the information about UI benefits: the number of UI 
benefit months, amount of UI benefits, and an indicator for multiple UI spells.  
Results in Table 2.7 suggest that male UI users are more likely than female UI users to 
join welfare. This result is statistically significant in specification 2. Rows 2 to 4 indicate that as 
education increases, the likelihood of joining welfare decreases. That is, less educated UI users 
are more likely to join the welfare programs as expected. The high school degree; technical, 
college, and university degree; and graduate degree holders in the pooled sample experience a 
decrease in the hazard of joining welfare by 32%, 50%, and 62% respectively, relative to the 
less-than-high-school degree holders. These percentages are all statistically significant at 1% 
level in both specifications.  
Results in Table 2.7 also show that labour market experience in full-time jobs does not 
affect the hazard of joining welfare given that the hazard rate is almost one for all, female, and 
male UI users in specifications 1 and 2. In specification 1, UI users from a higher income 
household are less likely to join the welfare program by 32% and 28%, and adding one more 
person to the household increases the hazard of joining welfare on average by 7% and 3% in 
specifications 1 and 2, but they are not statistically significant. Neither in specification 1 nor 2 
does the number of children have any significant effects on the hazard rates. 
The results in specification 2 show a positive relationship between the numbers of UI 
benefit months on the hazard of joining welfare. UI recipients with one more month benefit have 
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a 5% more chance in joining welfare. This percentage is 9% for male UI users in particular. This 
is consistent with the literature that shows a longer unemployment and longer use of UI benefits 
decrease exiting from unemployment and finding a job, and as a result, joining welfare is 
expected to be more likely. However, the other variable of UI, higher amount of UI benefits, 
decreases the hazard of joining welfare for male UI users by 15%, but it has no effect on female 
UI users. The UI male recipients who have had a large contribution to UI are less likely to join 
welfare after unemployment. This result is expected since these individuals have usually more 
job market attachments. Having multiple UI spells also does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the hazard rates suggesting that individuals with multiple usage of UI benefits are not 
statistically more likely to join welfare.  
Regarding the treatment variable, we should look at the interactions between the Age 45-
60 and Hartz dummies which determine the reforms impact, and they are statistically significant 
in the pooled and male samples at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. These results suggest that 
the Hartz reforms increase the hazard of joining welfare for age 45-60 by 40% in specification 1 
and by 33% in specification 2. These results are consistent with our findings in the descriptive 
statistics. Furthermore, there is a remarkable increase in the hazard of joining welfare for male 
UI users at the age of 45-60 by 93% and 85% in specifications 1 and 2 respectively. 
2.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, I consider the fact that the effects of reform might vary across ages and 
treatment groups. In the first sensitivity analysis of five analyses, I split the treatment group into 
four age groups: 30-44 (control), 45-49, 50-55, and 56-60. Then I re-estimate equation (1) 
including the age dummies of 45-49, 50-55, and 56-60 along with their interaction terms with the 
Hartz dummy. Table 2.8 shows the results of this age sensitivity analysis.   
The results of both model specifications in Table 2.8 are almost the same. The hazard 
ratios of three age groups in the second specification suggest that the hazard rates of joining 
welfare for 45-49, 50-55, and 56-60 year-old people are on average 50%, 40%, and 21% 
respectively higher than the hazard rate for the 30-44 year-old individuals in the control group. 
The results indicate that the younger treated group (age 45-49) is more likely to join welfare. 
Since older UI users have a retirement option, the chance of joining welfare after the reforms is 
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expected to be lower for the age 56-60 than for the younger individuals.  The hazard ratios for 
56-60 year-old individuals, is statistically insignificant. 
Table 2.9 also presents the results of two other sensitivity tests. In specification 1, I 
include three dummy variables indicating the number of previous UI spells to observe the effect 
of multiple UI spells on the likelihood of joining welfare. The treatment effect is consistent with 
the findings in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 that the Hartz reforms increase the hazard of joining welfare 
(about 32%). The statistically significant results of Table 2.9 also suggest that men who have 
experienced two previous UI spells in total have higher hazards of joining welfare (26%) than 
those who have used UI benefits only one time. Among women, having previous UI experience 
makes them less likely to join welfare. However, all the estimated hazard ratios are statistically 
insignificant for women. In specification 2, I re-estimate equation (1) using the sample of people 
who have one UI spell in the sample. The treatment effect is still positive but insignificant and 
smaller than specification 1 (15% versus 32%).  
The results of two more sensitivity analyses are reported in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. Table 
2.10 shows the cox-proportional hazard ratios of joining welfare for three age samples: age of 
30-60 (30-44 control and 45-60 treatment), age of 35-54 (35-44 control and 45-54 treatment), 
and age of 40-49 (40-44 control and 45-49 treatment). This comparison enables us to measure 
the treatment effect for the treatment and control groups that are closer in age. The age groups 
35-54 and 40-49 include more similar control and treatment groups.  
In all three age groups, one more month in UI duration increases the chance of joining 
welfare by about 5%. The treatment effects in all three estimations indicate that the Hartz 
reforms increase the likelihood of joining welfare. The first column reports that 45-60 year-old 
UI users are 33% more likely to join welfare than the 30-44 year-olds. In the second set of 
estimations, the 45-54 year-old UI users are 39% more likely than 35-44 year-olds, and based on 
the results in the third set of estimations, the UI users aged 45-49 have 66% more chance to join 
welfare than 40-44 year-old users. In effect, Table 2.10 sensitivity analysis shows that as we 
choose smaller samples, in which control and treatment groups have more similarities in terms of 
job market characteristics, the Hartz reforms have a stronger effect on the likelihood of joining 
welfare. 
 In the original sample used in this study, I deduct the individual income from the 
household income and keep the UI users whose remaining household income is less than their 
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welfare threshold.
41
 Now I re-estimate equation (1) by not deducting the individual income from 
the household income and I keep those whose household income is less than the welfare 
threshold.
42
 The results of this estimation are shown in Table 2.11. Based on the results, the 
Hartz reforms increase the chance of joining welfare by 23% for all women and men, and by 
64% only for men although the treatment effect is statistically significant only for men.  
2.8 Conclusion 
Policy makers and researchers have investigated the effects of a generous Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) program on post-unemployment outcomes for a few decades. The UI benefits 
provide some financial assistance for the unemployed and may prevent them for accepting jobs 
unmatched with their qualifications. The UI benefits might also have some negative effects on 
the labour market. A generous UI program may reduce incentives for the unemployed to actively 
look for a job during the unemployment. Improving the UI system and reducing layoffs and 
lengthy unemployment spells have been important policy concerns over the years. 
If the UI program is not helping to return the unemployed to employment, the UI users 
might have a transition to a welfare program such as Social Assistance (SA) which provides 
financial support to low income households. Any modifications in the UI system may affect this 
transition. For instance, a reduction in the amount and length of UI benefits may decrease the 
unemployment duration and increase the likelihood of finding a job for the unemployed. That is, 
a less generous UI program might cause a faster exit from unemployment and a faster return to 
employment, thereby making the unemployed less likely to use welfare after using the UI 
benefits. The alternative hypothesis is that the reduced amount or duration of UI benefits would 
increase the use of welfare benefits since these programs are good substitutes. Analyzing the 
effects of the UI program structure on the welfare program is very crucial from a political 
perspective, and studying the impacts of programs on each other may suggest a comprehensive 
reform rather than separate reforms to both programs. 
Therefore, estimating the likelihood of joining welfare and analyzing the factors affecting 
this probability is a post-unemployment outcome for individuals who have used UI and exit the 
                                                     
41
 Individuals whom the following inequality applies for: Household income – individual income < welfare 
threshold. 
 
42
 Individuals whom the following inequality applies for: Household income < welfare threshold. 
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unemployment. This study specifically investigates how a less generous UI program, in terms of 
UI duration, as a result of the Hartz reforms may affect the likelihood of joining welfare among 
the unemployed who have used their UI benefits. Although different post-unemployment 
outcomes have been analyzed in the literature, there is no enough research on joining a welfare 
program as a post-unemployment outcome after using UI benefits.The estimation results suggest 
that male UI users are more likely than female UI users to join welfare. Higher education 
decreases the likelihood of joining welfare: high school degree; technical, college, and university 
degree; and graduate degree holders in the pooled sample experience a decrease in the hazard of 
joining welfare by 38%, 50%, and 68% respectively, relative to the less-than-high-school degree 
holders, with all percentages statistically significant at 1% level. 
UI users from a higher income household are 32% less likely to join the welfare program, 
and adding one more person to the household increases the hazard of joining welfare by 7% and 
3% on average in two different specifications, but they are not statistically significant. Number 
of children has not statistically significant effects on the hazard rates of joining welfare. The 
results also show that lengthier UI benefits increase the hazard of joining welfare by 5%. 
However, the higher amount of UI benefits rather decreases the hazard of joining welfare for 
male UI users by 15%. Having multiple UI spells also does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the hazard rates. 
Regarding the treatment variable, the results show that the Hartz reforms increase the 
hazard of joining welfare for 45-60 year-old UI users by 33% when we control for UI 
characteristics. These results are consistent with our findings in the descriptive analysis section. 
Furthermore, there is a remarkable increase of 85% in the hazard of joining welfare for male UI 
users at the age of 45-60 controlling for UI characteristics. Therefore, this study finds that a less 
generous UI program as a result of the Hartz reforms has a negative effect on the unemployed 
such that it pushes the UI users to welfare and makes them more likely to be welfare users after 
using their UI benefits. This result is consistent in all different sensitivity analyses.  
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2.9 Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Main eligibility conditions of social programs benefits in Germany 
Before the Hartz reforms After the Hartz reforms 
Social Assistance (Sozialhilfe): 
 
 Insufficient contribution for UI I 
 Income and assets must be below a specified 
minimum level 
 Possibly available for part-time or full-time 
work 
Social Assistance (Sozialhilfe): 
 
 Insufficient contribution for UI I 
 Income and assets must be below a specified 
minimum level 
 Incapable of working 
Unemployment Assistance (Arbeitslosengeld):  
 
 Contributions to UI I is required but the 
entitlements to UI I is expired and still need 
assistance  
Unemployment Benefits II  
(Arbeitslosengeld II ): 
 
 Insufficient contribution for UI I 
 Income and assets must be below a specified 
minimum level 
 Available for at least part-time work 
   Source: Königs (2014) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary of institutional changes in the potential compensation UI duration 
 Maximal duration of benefits in months 
Age Group From January 1, 1997  
to January 31, 2006 
From February 1, 2006  
to December 31, 2007 
Since January 1, 2008 
Less than 45 12 12 12 
45-46 18 12 12 
47-49 22 12 12 
50-51 22 12 15 
52-54 26 12 15 
55-56 26 18 18 
57  32 18 18 
58 or older 32 18 24 
    Source: Amable and Francon (2014) 
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    Table 2.3- Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Total sample 
Age 30-60 
Control group 
Age 30-44 
Treatment group 
Age 45-60 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Female .46 .50 .47 .50 .45 .50 
Age  45 9 37 4.3 53 4.8 
LHS .13 .34 .13 .33 .14 .35 
HS .54 .50 .53 .50 .55 .50 
TCU .26 .44 .27 .45 .25 .43 
GRAD .06 .24 .07 .25 .05 .22 
Job experience (year) 18 11 11 6 24 9.7 
Individual labour income* (euro) 9,791 14,209 10,434 11,442 9,199 16,328 
Log individual labour income* (euro) 9.1 1 9.1 1 9.1 1.1 
Household income* (euro) 28,281 29,242 28,262 24,350 28,299 33,119 
Log household income* (euro) 10 1 10 .94 10 1.1 
Household size 2.8 1.2 3.1 1.3 2.5 1.11 
Number of children .7 .9 1.1 1.1 .3 .6 
Number of months in the last year UI spell  6.5 3.9 5.6 3.6 7.2 3.9 
Amount of benefit in the last year UI spell 
(euro)* 
4,957 4,106 4,103 3,339 5,743 4,565 
Log of amount of benefit in the last year 
UI spell (euro)* 
8.2 .9 8 .9 8.3 .9 
Observations of UI spells 2,404  
(100%) 
1,153 
(48%) 
1,251 
(52%) 
    LHS: Less-than-High School; HS: High School Degree; TCU: Technical, College, and University Degree;  
   GRAD: Graduate Degree.  
   * deflated with CPI 2006=1 
    Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
   Table 2.4- Frequency of UI recipients who join welfare within several years after receiving UI benefits (%) 
 Total  
Age 30-60 
Control  
Age 30-44 
Treatment  
Age 45-60 
Percentage of UI users joining welfare…    
                                         …in the same year of UI  60% 
 
59% 
 
60% 
 
                                         ...within 1 year after UI  32% 
 
31% 
 
33% 
 
                                         …within 2 years after UI  4% 
 
5% 
 
4% 
 
                                        … within 3 or more years after UI  4% 
 
5% 
 
3% 
 
Total observations of all UI users joining welfare 697 
(100%) 
362 
(100%) 
335 
(100%) 
  Source: Author’s calculation 
 61 
 
 
 
    Table 2.5- Frequency of multiple UI spells and multiple transitions to welfare 
Number of spells 1 2 3 4 5 & more Total 
observations 
Percentage of UI users 55.1% 27.5% 11.5% 3.9% 1.6% 2,404  
 (100%) 
Percentage of UI users 
joining welfare for each 
spell of transition 
47.8% 30.3% 15.3% 4.4% 2.2% 697 
(100%) 
  Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 2.6- Percentage of UI users joining welfare in the treatment and control groups before and  
  after the Hartz reforms 
 Age group 30-44  
(Control) 
Age group 45-60 
(Treatment) 
Difference  
(Treatment-Control) 
Before 2006 Hartz (𝑯𝟏) 0.22 0.17 -0.5 
After 2006 Hartz (𝑯𝟐) 0.10 0.8 -0.2 
Difference (𝑯𝟏 − 𝑯𝟐) -0.12 -0.9 0.30 
  Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 2.1 - Nelson-Aalen cumulative pre- and         Figure 2.2 - Nelson-Aalen cumulative pre- and  
  post-reforms hazard rates for control group               post-reforms hazard rates for treatment group                                                                                        
          
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 2.7- Estimated Cox-proportional hazard ratios of joining welfare for three samples: all, 
female, and male people who have used UI benefits in the past 
 Hazard ratio in specification 1 
(Robust S.E) 
 Hazard ratio in specification 2 
(Robust S.E) 
 All Female Male  All Female Male 
Female .89 
(.10) 
   .87* 
(.08) 
  
HS .62*** 
(.07) 
.71** 
(.12) 
.57*** 
(.08) 
 .62*** 
(.07) 
.71** 
(.12) 
.58*** 
(.09) 
TCU .50*** 
(.56) 
.63*** 
(.12) 
.39*** 
(.07) 
 .50*** 
(.06) 
.63*** 
(.12) 
.40*** 
(.07) 
GRAD .32  ***  
(.09) 
.45** 
(.18) 
.21*** 
(.08) 
 .32*** 
(.09) 
.46** 
(.18) 
.22*** 
(.08) 
Full time labour market  
experience (year) 
1 
(.005) 
1.01* 
(.01) 
.98** 
(.01) 
 1 
(.005) 
1.01* 
(.01) 
.98** 
(.01) 
Logarithm of household 
income (euros) 
.68*** 
(.02) 
.73*** 
(.03) 
.64*** 
(.03) 
 .72*** 
(.02) 
.75*** 
(.03) 
.72*** 
(.03) 
Number of individuals in the 
household 
1.07 
(.06) 
1.06 
(.09) 
1.05 
(.07) 
 1.03 
(.06) 
1.05 
(.09) 
1.01 
(.07) 
Number of children .95 
(.06) 
.92 
(.09) 
.97 
(.09) 
 .98 
(.07) 
.93 
(.09) 
1.02 
(.10) 
Number of months receiving 
UI benefits 
    1.05*** 
(.01) 
1.03 
(.02) 
1.09*** 
(.02) 
Logarithm of UI benefits     .97 
(.06) 
1.01 
(.09) 
.85** 
(.07) 
Multiple UI spells indicator     .97 
(.07) 
.82 
(.10) 
1.05 
(.09) 
Hartz .46*** 
(.11) 
.68 
(.24) 
.36*** 
(.12) 
 .48*** 
(.12) 
.78 
(.27) 
.35*** 
(.12) 
Age 45-60 .95 
(.10) 
.98 
(.14) 
1.21 
(.21) 
 .93 
(.10) 
.97 
(.14) 
1.17 
(.20) 
Hartz  x Age 45-60 1.40* 
(.28) 
.91 
(.31) 
1.93** 
(.51) 
 1.33* 
(.28) 
.85 
(.31) 
1.85** 
(.50) 
year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State of residence fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of total spells  2,404 998 1,406  2,404 998 1,406 
HS: high school degree, TCU: technical, college, and university degree, GRAD: graduate degree. 
*p=10%   **p=5%   ***p=10% 
Source: Author’s calculation
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Table 2.8- Estimated Cox-proportional hazard ratios of joining welfare for 45-49, 50-55, and 56-60 
year-old people who have used UI benefits in the past. 
 Hazard ratio in specification 1 
(Robust S.E) 
 Hazard ratio in specification 2 
(Robust S.E) 
 All Female Male  All Female Male 
Hartz .46*** 
(.12) 
.72 
(.27) 
.35*** 
(.12) 
 .49*** 
(.12) 
.84 
(.32) 
.36*** 
(.12) 
Age 45-49 .96 
(.12) 
1.12 
(.20) 
1.10 
(.21) 
 .95 
(.12) 
1.12 
(.20) 
1.07 
(.20) 
Age 50-55 .95 
(.14) 
.92 
(.21) 
1.38* 
(.29) 
 .90 
(.13) 
.89 
(.20) 
1.27 
(.27) 
Age 56-60 .76* 
(.14) 
.68* 
(.17) 
1.27 
(.36) 
 .68** 
(.12) 
.64* 
(.16) 
1.09 
(.30) 
Hartz  x Age 45-49 1.56* 
(.42) 
1.16 
(.52) 
2.13** 
(.73) 
 1.5* 
(.41) 
1.14 
(.51) 
1.99** 
(.69) 
Hartz  x Age 50-55 1.44* 
(.40) 
.68 
(.34) 
2.37*** 
(.83) 
 1.4 
(.39) 
.65 
(.33) 
2.27** 
(.81) 
Hartz  x Age 56-60 1.27 
(.39) 
1.07 
(.49) 
1.49 
(.64) 
 1.21 
(.37) 
.97 
(.45) 
1.47 
(.62) 
Number of months receiving 
UI benefits 
No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Logarithm of UI benefits No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Multiple UI spells indicator No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
UI-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Rest of characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State of residence fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of total spells  2,404 998 1,406  2,404 998 1,406 
*p=10%   **p=5%   ***p=10% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 2.9- Estimated Cox-proportional hazard ratios of joining welfare using two samples:  
1- Indicators for the number of UI spells on the baseline sample; 2- Single spell sample 
 Hazard ratio in specification 1 
(Robust S.E) 
 Hazard ratio in specification 2 
(Robust S.E) 
 All Female Male  All Female Male 
Hartz .48*** 
(.13) 
.77 
(.31) 
.35*** 
(.12) 
 .97 
(.31) 
1.35 
(.59) 
.66 
(.30) 
Age 45-60 .93 
(.11) 
.97 
(.17) 
1.17 
(.21) 
 .99 
(.12) 
.97 
(.17) 
1.26 
(.24) 
Hartz  x Age 45-60 1.32* 
(.28) 
.85 
(.29) 
1.84** 
(.53) 
 1.15 
(.33) 
.81 
(.37) 
1.64* 
(.62) 
Number of months receiving 
UI benefits 
1.05*** 
(.02) 
1.03 
(.02) 
1.09*** 
(.02) 
 1.05*** 
(.02) 
1.02 
(.03) 
1.11*** 
(.03) 
Logarithm of UI benefits .97 
(.06) 
1 
(.09) 
.85** 
(.07) 
 .96 
(.07) 
1.03 
(.10) 
.83** 
(.08) 
One previous UI spell 
indicator 
.94 
(.06) 
.80** 
(.08) 
1.01 
(.08) 
    
Two previous UI spell 
indicator 
1.12 
(.13) 
.86 
(.18) 
1.26* 
(.18) 
    
Three or more previous UI 
spell indicator 
.87 
(.23) 
.94 
(.43) 
.88 
(.27) 
    
Multiple UI spells indicator No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
UI-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State of residence fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of total spells  2,404 998 1,406  1,399 619 780 
*p=10%   **p=5%   ***p=10% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 2.10- Estimated Cox-proportional hazard ratios of joining welfare using three different age groups: 30-60, 35-54, and 40-49. 
 Hazard ratio in 30-60  
age group 
(Robust S.E) 
 Hazard ratio in 35-54  
age group 
 (Robust S.E) 
 Hazard ratio in 40-49  
age group 
 (Robust S.E) 
 All Female Male  All Female Male  All Female Male  
Number of months 
receiving UI benefits 
1.05*** 
(.01) 
1.03 
(.02) 
1.09*** 
(.02) 
 1.05*** 
(.02) 
1.04* 
(.03) 
1.07*** 
(.03) 
 1.06*** 
(.03) 
1.03 
(.03) 
1.09** 
(.11) 
Logarithm of UI benefits .97 
(.06) 
1.01 
(.09) 
.85** 
(.07) 
 .98 
(.07) 
1.03 
(.10) 
.88* 
(.08) 
 .99 
(.09) 
1.31** 
(.18) 
.79* 
(.11) 
Multiple UI spells indicator .97 
(.07) 
.82* 
(.10) 
1.05 
(.09) 
 .94 
(.08) 
.82* 
(.11) 
.99 
(.11) 
 .85* 
(.10) 
.93 
(.17) 
.84 
(.14) 
Hatrz .48*** 
(.12) 
.78 
(.27) 
.35*** 
(.12) 
 .30*** 
(.11) 
.52* 
(.26) 
.20*** 
(.11) 
 .32** 
(.19) 
.79 
(.59) 
.14** 
(.15) 
Age 45-60 .93 
(.10) 
.97 
(.14) 
1.17 
(.20) 
        
Hartz  x Age 45-60 1.33* 
(.28) 
.85 
(.31) 
1.85** 
(.50) 
        
Age 45-54     .90 
(.11) 
1.08 
(.20) 
.96 
(.18) 
    
Hartz  x Age 45-54     1.39* 
(.36) 
.88 
(.37) 
1.96** 
(.67) 
    
Age 45-49         .83 
(.12) 
1.01 
(.22) 
.85 
(.18) 
Hartz  x Age 45-49         1.66* 
(.58) 
.84* 
(.43) 
2.47* 
(1.2) 
year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State of residence fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of total spells  2,404 998 1,406  1,535 652 883  783 339 444 
*p=10%   **p=5%   ***p=10% 
Source: Author’s calculation
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Table 2.11- Estimated Cox-proportional hazard ratios of joining welfare  
using the sample whose household income is less than welfare threshold 
 
  Hazard Ratio  
(Robust S.E) 
  All Female Male 
Female  .86* 
(.08) 
  
HS  .62*** 
(.07) 
.68*** 
(.11) 
.58*** 
(.09) 
TCU  .49*** 
(.06) 
.58*** 
(.11) 
.40*** 
(.07) 
GRAD  .41*** 
(.12) 
.54* 
(.23) 
.30*** 
(.11) 
Full time labour market  experience 
(year) 
 1 
(.005) 
1.01* 
(.01) 
.98** 
(.01) 
Logarithm of household income 
(euros) 
 .72*** 
(.03) 
.76*** 
(.04) 
.72*** 
(.04) 
Number of individuals in the 
household 
 1.05 
(.06) 
1.02 
(.09) 
1.05 
(.08) 
Number of children  .98 
(.07) 
.94 
(.10) 
1.01 
(.10) 
Number of months receiving UI 
benefits 
 1.06*** 
(.02) 
1.03* 
(.02) 
1.10*** 
(.02) 
Logarithm of UI benefits  .96 
(.06) 
.99 
(.10) 
.83** 
(.07) 
Multiple UI spells indicator  .97 
(.07) 
.84* 
(.10) 
1.02 
(.10) 
Hatrz  .41*** 
(.12) 
.46* 
(.22) 
.40*** 
(.15) 
Age 45-60  .92 
(.11) 
.92 
(.16) 
1.16 
(.21) 
Hartz  x Age 45-60  1.23* 
(.28) 
.89 
(.32) 
1.64* 
(.50) 
year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
State of residence fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of total spells   1,954 847 1,107 
 HS: high school degree, TCU: technical, college, and university degree,  
 GRAD: graduate degree. *p=10%   **p=5%   ***p=10% 
  Source: Author’s calculation 
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Chapter 3. Debt-asset and debt-income ratios across different income levels in Canada: 
Empirical evidence from the Survey of Financial Security 
3.1 Introduction 
Canadians currently owe more than their ability to repay what is owed. Canada’s debt-
income ratio rose to about 165% at the end of June 2015, the highest increase in this ratio since 
2011.That is, Canadians owe about $1.65 for every dollar of their disposable income is identified 
by the central bank of Canada as a key vulnerability in the economy.
43
 Statistics Canada reports 
that 67% of Canadian families had debts in 1999 and this percentage increased to 71% by 2012. 
The median debt-income ratio rose from 0.78 to 1.10 between 1999 and 2012, while the median 
debt-asset ratio remained constant over these years. Around 35% of Canadian families had a 
debt-income ratio above 2 in 2012 compared to 23% in 1999.  
Falling interest rates, increasing housing prices and changes in the performance of 
financial markets and economic conditions have affected the process of wealth accumulation 
over time. These changes have increased the importance of both assets and debts in family 
finances as key measures of economic and social well-being. There is a paucity of empirical 
analysis on different types of debt trends, debt-income and debt-asset ratios across income levels 
in Canada. Evaluating these factors is determinant of contemporary policy. These metrics 
provide critical information for policymakers.  
This study uses the Survey of Financial Security to analyze these factors across different 
income levels. This dataset is a cross-sectional micro-data file that collects detailed information 
for Canadian households. Most studies have used aggregated data at the national level; however, 
our analysis uses household level data from the 1999, 2005, and 2012 Surveys of Financial 
Security to specifically examine trends in different types of debts among Canadian families and 
the debt-asset and debt-income ratios across various income levels in Canada.
44
  
3.2 Literature Review 
The concern of increasing household indebtedness has been examined in some 
international studies. Canner et al. (1995) report an increase in home mortgage and consumer 
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 For more details, please see the Statistics Canada report http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/debt-income-net-
worth-1.3223917 
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 For more details, please see the link: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-006-x/2015001/article/14167-eng.htm 
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installment debt in US during the economic expansion of 1983-89. Over this period, the 
aggregate debt relative to disposable income rose from 56% to 78% which was a high record at 
that time. Barnes and Young (2003) also confirm that the debt to income ratio has increased 
substantially in USA during the 1990s. May, Tudela and Young (2004) in the UK have also 
explored the distribution of debt across British households. They find that the largest part of the 
increasing debt is owed by homeowners with mortgages. Debelle (2004) also confirms the high 
household indebtedness for OECD countries over 1995-2002. In Poland in 2005, Zajaczkowski 
and Zochowski (2006) find similar results with the vast majority of household debt payment 
related to increasing housing loans. Comparing the household debt ratio and debt service ratio 
across five European countries, Herrala (2006) finds that the debt service ratio is lower for 
Finland than for UK, USA, Italy, or Spain. A peer-reviewed study by Ekici and Dunn (2010) also 
shows that credit card debt has a significant effect on the increasing consumption growth in US. 
They use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) and the Ohio Economic Survey 
(OES) over late 1990s and early 2000s and find that a thousand dollar increase in credit card debt 
decreases total household consumption growth by 2%. 
Among Canadian studies, Chawla and Wannell (2005) investigate trends in debt and 
spending for Canadian families using the 1982 Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX) and 2001 
Survey of Household Spending (SHS). They find that per-capita debt grew twice as pre-tax 
income over 1982-2001 and the proportion of households who spent more than their income 
increased from 39% in 1982 to 47% in 2001. Statistics Canada (2007) uses aggregate data over 
1980-2005 and compares Canada and USA in terms of household debts and debt-income ratio. In 
1980, Canadian spending was about 80% of their disposable income, whereas American 
spending was about 88%. Both countries spending reached to 95% in 2005. However, spending 
is not the only consumption; debts also need to be compared over these years. Canadians and 
Americans owed less than 70 cents for every dollar of their disposable income in 1980. By 2005, 
household debt had reached to $1.16 and $1.24 for every dollar of disposable income for 
Canadians and Americans respectively.  
Using household level data, Faruqui (2008) uses the Canadian Financial Monitor and 
shows an increase in debt-disposable income ratio over 1999-2007. He finds that high-risk 
families, who are low-income households earning $35,000 or less, have the highest debt service 
ratio exceeding 40%. Meh et al (2008) also document an increase in debt-income ratio by using 
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data from the 1999 and 2005 Surveys of Financial Security. They show that the increase in 
mortgage balances, credit card debt, and home equity lines of credit are the sources of an 
increase in debt-income ratio in Canada. Furthermore, using data from the first Canadian 
Financial Capability Survey (CFCS), Hurst (2011) finds an increasing household debt over 1984-
2009. He finds that the debt-income ratio was 148% in 2008 and 2009, while the debt-asset ratio 
reached 19.6% by 2009, the highest rate recorded. He also finds that younger families had the 
highest debt-income ratio and lone parents had the highest debt-asset ratio in 2009, and people 
born in Canada were less likely to have a high debt-income ratio compared to immigrants. 
The above review shows that the debt-income and debt-asset ratios across households 
have been studied in the literature. However, to the best of our knowledge, we are unaware of 
any recent empirical study that has used Survey of Financial Security to analyze these factors 
across different income levels. Most studies have used aggregated data at the national level; 
however, our analysis uses household level data from the 1999, 2005, and 2012 Survey of 
Financial Security to specifically examine the trends of different types of debts among Canadian 
families and the debt-asset and debt-income ratios across various income levels in Canada.
45
  
3.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
3.3.1 The Survey of Financial Security 
The Survey of Financial Security (SFS) is a cross-sectional public-use micro-data file that 
collects detailed information on income, expenses, assets, debts, and wealth for Canadian 
households over the last year prior to January of the interview year. It also has some 
demographic characteristics of the household members (e.g. age, education, gender). The SFS is 
conducted in two months for 1983, 1999, 2005, and 2012 for all 10 provinces (May-June in 1999 
and 2005, and September-November in 2012). The data for this study are extracted from 1999, 
2005, and 2012 cycles for different income levels: below $40K, between $40K and $60K, 
between $60K and $80K, between $80K and $100K, and greater than $100K per year 
respectively.
46
 Debts include mortgage on principal residence, mortgage on non-principal 
residence, credit card, student loan, vehicle loan, line of credit, and other loans from financial 
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 I deflate all numbers by using 2002 CPI calculated by Statistics Canada. 
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institutions. Assets are usually made up of real estate, personal belongings and savings, financial 
investments, and employer pension plans. The tables of descriptive statistics for different types 
of household debts, total debts, total income, and total assets from all three cycles of the SFS are 
documented in the appendix.  
As noted on the study documentations of the SFS, the surveys do not cover 2% of the 
population approximately. These exclusions are the following groups: people living on reserves 
and other aboriginal lands; official representatives of foreign countries living in Canada and their 
families; members of religious and other communal colonies; members of the Canadian Forces 
living on military bases or in military camps; persons living full-time in institutions, for example, 
inmates of penal institutions and chronic care patients living in hospitals and nursing homes.  
The numbers of dwellings from two sample sources are summarized in Table 3.1. Total 
number of dwellings is 23,000 in the 1999 survey, 9,000 in the 2005 survey, and 20,000 in the 
2012 survey. The SFS surveys are drawn from two sources. The 1999 and 2005 surveys are 
stratified, multi-stage samples selected from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) and from geographic 
areas in which a large proportion of family units were defined as high-income (with total family 
income of at least $200,000 or investment income of at least $50,000). The 2012 survey is 
selected from the LFS frame and a frame constructed from the urban portion that is Census 
Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) and Census Agglomerations (CAs) of the 2009 T1 family file 
(T1FF).  
3.4 Methodology and Results 
3.4.1 Debt-Income and Debt-Asset Ratios 
In this paper, I calculate total debts relative to income and assets for different income 
levels over three years 1999, 2005, and 2012. The debt-income ratio is calculated by dividing 
average household total debts by their average total income. The households with higher debts-
income ratios are at a greater risk of falling behind on their debt payments, specifically if their 
assets are not liquid. Likewise, the debt-asset ratio is calculated by dividing average total 
household debts by their average total assets. This ratio assesses household long-term 
vulnerability. A higher debt-asset ratio shows that a greater portion of the household’s assets 
need to be liquidated to pay off their debts when households have difficulties to pay out their 
debts using their income. Tables 3.2-3.7 present the debt-income and debt-asset ratios for three 
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samples of households in years 1999, 2005, and 2012 across income levels. Since some 
households have no debts, these two ratios are calculated twice: the first rows in front of each 
year show the ratios for all income earners including those with zero debt, and the second rows 
in front of each year present the ratios for debt holders among income earners.  
Table 3.8 summarizes the average debt-income and debt-asset ratios from Tables 3.2-3.7. 
Considering all debt and non-debt holders in 1999, the first row in Table 3.8 shows that the debt-
income ratio is 4.3 for the income level less than $40K, .97 for $40K-$60K income level, .87 for 
$60K-$80K income level, .76 for $80K-$100K income level, .66 for $100K-$150K income 
level, and .47 for income levels greater than $150K in 1999. This ratio is greater than one (4.3) 
only for low income households with income levels less than $40K. This finding implies that the 
average debt for low income households is 4.3 times more than their average income. In other 
words, for every dollar the low income households earn, they owe 4.3 dollars on average. This 
ratio is less than one for all other income levels greater than $40K and it is decreasing as income 
level increases. This means that richer households have less debt relative to their income. For 
instance, households with income levels greater than $150K owe 47 cents for every dollar they 
earn on average. Once I calculate this ratio only for debt holders, the ratio are greater than one 
for households in three income levels: 7.1 for income level less than $40K, 1.2 for $40K-$60K 
income level, and 1.04 for $60K-$80K income level indicating that households in these three 
income levels owe respectively 7.1, 1.2, and 1.04 dollars for every dollar they earn on average. 
Considering household assets in 1999, the calculated average debt-asset ratios for all debt and 
non-debt holders in Table 3.8 are less than one for all income levels indicating that households in 
all income levels owe less than the value of their assets in 1999. However, the average debt-asset 
ratio is greater than one (1.3) when I calculate it only for debt holders with the income level less 
than $40K. In effect, these low income debt holders have both average debt-income and debt-
asset ratios greater than one showing their vulnerability in debt repaying. 
Looking at the third and fourth rows of Table 3.8, one can see that the average debt-
income ratio has increased for all income levels in 2005. It is 4.3 for households with income 
levels less than $40K, 1.3 for $40K-$60K, 1.14 for $60K-$80K, 1.04 for $80K-$100K, .94 for 
$100K-$150K, and .61 for income levels greater than $150K. Once I calculate debt-income ratio 
only for debt holders, the average debt-income ratio increases for all income levels. It is 7.2 for 
household income less than $40K, 1.6 for $40K-$60K, 1.37 for $60K-$80K, 1.23 for $80K-
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$100K, 1.17 for $100K-$150K, and .90 for income levels greater than $150K. This ratio has 
again increased in 2012 for all income levels. Rows 5 and 6 of the tables show this ratio for all 
income levels: 6 for household income less than $40K, 1.5 for $40K-$60K, 1.54 for $60K-$80K, 
1.46 for $80K-$100K, 1.25 for $100K-$150K, and .93 for income levels greater than $150K. 
Calculating only for debt holders, this ratio becomes even larger for all income levels: 11.7 for 
households with income level less than $40K, 2 for $40K-$60K, 1.89 for $60K-$80K, 1.77 for 
$80K-$100K, 1.50 for $100K-$150K, and 1.21 for income levels greater than $150K. 
The increasing debt-income ratios over these years suggest that the power of households 
to pay back their debts has tremendously decreased over these three years. The bottom half of 
Table 3.8 documents the average debt-asset ratios from Tables 3.2-3.7. The seventh and eighth 
rows of Table 3.8 show that the debts relative to assets have also increased for all income levels 
in 2005 compared to the ones in 1999: 1.7 for household income less than $40K, .30 for $40K-
$60K, .39 for $60K-$80K, .23 for $80K-$100K, .20 for $100K-$150K, and .10 for income levels 
greater than $150K. This ratio has increased in 2012 when I calculate it only for debt holders: It 
is 3.1 for household income less than $40K, .40 for $40K-$60K, .46 for $60K-$80K, .28 for 
$80K-$100K, .25 for $100K-$150K, and .15 for income levels greater than $150K. However, the 
debt-asset ratios in 2012 are decreased for households with the income level less than $40K: .9 
(all) and 1.6 (only debt holders), and for households with the income level between $60K and 
$80K: .28 (all) and .34 (only debt holders). For other income levels in 2012, the debt-asset ratio 
is either constant or increased: .3 (all) and .4 (only debt holders) for $40K-$60K, .25 (all) and .30 
(only debt holders) for $80K-$100K, .22 (all) and .27 (only debt holders) for $100K-$150K, and 
.15 (all) and .20 (only debt holders) for income levels greater than $150K.  
Average debt-income and debt-asset ratios are also illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. As 
it is discussed earlier, the debt-income ratio is 4.3 in 1999 and 2005, and it is increased to 6 in 
2012 for households with income less than $40K. The average debt-asset ratios for these low 
income earners are 0.7, 0.9, and 1.7 respectively in 1999, 2005, and 2012. Both ratios are lower 
for households with lower levels of income. The average debt-income ratios in 2012 are all 
increased in 2005 and 2012 compared to 1999 across all income levels. In the following sections, 
I present the average total debts and assets and average ratio of different types of debts relative to 
total debts across various income levels to find out the source of indebtedness of Canadian 
households over the study time.  
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3.4.2 Average Total Debts and Assets 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the trends of average total debts and assets across different 
income levels in 1999, 2005, and 2012. Not surprisingly, the graphs show that the average total 
debts and assets are higher for households with higher income. Comparing the trends of debts 
and assets over the three years, one can see that the average total debts are increased over the 
years for all income levels. For example, low income households holding an income level less 
than $40K have the average debts of $30K in 1999, $43K in 2005, and $57K in 2012 indicating 
an increase of 43% in 2005 and 90% increase in 2012 compared to 1999. At the opposite side of 
the income ladder, households with an income level more than $150K have the average total 
debts of $149K in 1999, $250K in 2005, and $278K in 2012 indicating an increase of 68% in 
2005 and 87% in 2012 compared to 1999. Thus, the average total debts in 2012 have increased 
for low income households more than for high income holders. Based on Graph 3.4, the average 
total assets for households with an income level less than $40K has increased from 168K in 1999 
to $258K in 2005 (54% increase) and to $336K in 2012 (100% increase). At the opposite side of 
the income ladder, the average total assets for households with an income level more than 150K 
has increased from $1,317K in 1999 to $3,201K in 2005 (143% increase) and then it has been 
decreased to $2,470K in 2012 (30% decrease) compared to 2005. This decrease is the only 
exception in these two graphs. 
3.4.3 Average Ratios of Different Types of Debts Relative to Total Debts 
Average ratios of different types of debts relative to total debts are illustrated in Figures 
3.5 and 3.6 for 1999, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 for 2005, and Figures 3.9 and 3.10 for 2012. Figure 3.5 
revealed that mortgages on non-principal and principal residences are two main sources of high 
debts in 1999 across all income levels. These two debt ratios are also the highest ratios in 2005 
and 2012. In 1999, the ratios of average mortgage on non- principal residence debts are higher 
for lower level income earners (42.4% for less-than-$40K income earners versus 33.9% for 
more-than-$150K income earners), while the ratio of average mortgage on principal residence 
debts are higher for those households with higher level income (34.1% for less-than-$40K 
income earners versus 38.5% for more-than-$150K income earners). These findings are not 
consistent for 2005 and 2012. 
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Comparing Figures 3.5, 3.7, and 3.9, the average ratio of mortgage on non- principal 
residence debts relative to total debts are 42.4%, 48.2%, and 44.4% respectively in 1999, 2005, 
and 2012 for households with the income level less than $40K. This ratio is lower to 40.4% and 
41.3% in 1999 and 2005 and higher to 47% in 2012 for $40K-$60K income level earners. For 
households in $60K-$80K income levels, the ratio continues to drop to 38% and 34.9% in 1999 
and 2005, and continue to rise to 49.2% in 2012. For $80K-$100K income levels, it becomes 
lower to 35.5% in 1999, but it increases to 38.5% and 47.5% in 2005 and 2012. The ratios are 
40%, 39.3%, and 39.3% in 1999, 2005, and 2012 respectively for $100K-$150K income earners. 
And finally the ratios are 33.9%, 42.5%, and 44.1% for the income levels greater than $150K. As 
it is mentioned earlier, the other main source of debts is the average mortgage on principal 
residence over 1999, 2005, and 2012. The ratios of average mortgage on principal residence 
relative to total debts are 34.1% for 0-$40K income level, 36.4% for $40K-$60K, 36.8% for 
$60K-$80K, 37.5% for $80K-$100K, 35.2% for $100K-$150K, and 38.5% for income levels 
more than $150K. This ratio does not have a specific pattern across different income levels in 
2005 and 2012. 
Figures 3.6, 3.8, and 3.10 also illustrate the ratios of other types of debts relative to total 
debts in 1999, 2005, and 2012 respectively excluding the average ratios of mortgages on 
principal and non- principal residences. For income levels more than $150K, the average debts 
on line of credit and loans from financial institutions are the two highest ratios in 1999 and 2005. 
Excluding the mortgage debt ratios, the line of credit debt ratios are the highest debt ratios in 
2012, and the ratios of loans from financial institutions drop and get close to the ratios of student 
loans in 2012. The average ratios of student loan and vehicle loan are the two lowest ratios over 
all three years. Therefore, mortgages on principal and non-principal residences are two main 
sources of high indebtedness of Canadian households. Moreover, the debt on line of credit has 
the next highest debt ratio over 1999, 2005, and 2012.  
3.5 Summary 
Increasing household indebtedness is current Canada economy concern that needs to be 
well studied. This study uses the Survey of Financial Security (SFS) and documents the average 
total debts relative to total income and total assets for different income levels over three years of 
1999, 2005, and 2012. Households with higher debt-income ratios are at a greater risk of falling 
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behind on their debt payments and those with higher debt-asset ratios have long-term 
vulnerability. In effect, a high debt-asset ratio indicates that the households may need to pay out 
their debts using more of their assets in addition to their income. The results show that the debt-
income ratio has increased for all income levels over three years suggesting that power of 
households to pay back their debts has decreased from 1999 to 2012. The debt-asset ratios have 
also increased for all income levels in 2005 compared to the ones in 1999, but this ratio has 
increased in 2012 only for income levels greater than $80K.  
For instance, the average debt-income ratio for low-income households earning less than 
$40K is 4.3 in 1999 and 6 in 2012 meaning that these households owe, on average, $4.3 and $6 
for every dollar they earn respectively in 1999 and 2012. The debt-income is less than one for all 
other income levels greater than $40K and it is decreasing as income level increases. Therefore, 
households with higher levels of income have less debt relative to their income in 1999. When I 
calculate this ratio only for debt holders, the ratio is greater than one for households in three 
income levels: 7.1 for income levels less than $40K, 1.20 for $40K-$60K, and 1.04 for $60K-
$80K. Findings on the calculated average debt-asset ratios show that this ratio is less than one for 
all income levels greater than $40K indicating that these households owe less than the value of 
their assets. In fact, low income debt-holders have both average debt-income and debt-asset 
ratios greater than one showing their vulnerability in debt payments.  
Comparing the trends of total debts, we can see that the average total debts are increased over 
the three years for all income levels. The study finds that the average ratios of mortgages on 
principal and non- principal debts relative to total debts are the highest ratios compared to the 
ratios of other types of debts. So the main sources of this increase are the mortgages on non-
principal and principal residences. Furthermore, in 1999, excluding the income level $110K-
$150K, the ratio of average mortgage on non- principal residence debts over total debts is more 
for higher levels of income, while the ratio of average mortgage on principal residence debts 
over total debts increases as level of income raises. This finding is not consistent for 2005 and 
2012. Finally, excluding the average mortgage on principal and non- principal residences, the 
findings report that the average ratios of credit card debts relative to total debts are the next 
highest ratio over all three years compared to other types of debts. The ratios of student loan and 
vehicle loan relative to total debts are the two lowest ratios over these three years. 
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3.6 Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Total number of dwellings from three cycles of 1999, 2005, and 2012 Survey of Financial 
Security  
 
 
Survey year 
 
Total number of 
dwellings 
 
Number of dwelling 
from the LFS 
frame 
Number of 
dwellings from 
high-income 
family areas 
Number of 
dwellings from 
the urban TIFF 
frame 
1999 23,000 21,000 2,000 NA 
2005 9,000 7,500 1,500 NA 
2012 20,000 11,591 NA 8,409 
Source: http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=2620&lang=en&db=imdb&adm=8&dis=2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Debt-income and debt-asset ratios in 1999, 2005, and 2012 for households with an income 
level below $40K (including) per year  
      
Row  
Debt-income ratio 
Number of 
observations 
Mean  
Std. 
dev.  
Minimum 
ratio  
Maximum 
ratio  
1 1999 (including all) 7,556 4.3 70.2 0 3,280 
2 1999 (including only all debt holders) 4,509 7.1 90.8 .001 3,280 
3 2005 (including all) 2,121 4.3 51.4 0 2,040 
4 2005 (including only all debt holders) 1,274 7.2 66.1 .002 2,040 
5 2012 (including all) 4,047 6 68.9 0 2,200 
6 2012 (including only all debt holders) 2,410 11.7 88.9 .001 2,200 
 Debt-asset ratio      
7 1999 (including all) 8,807 .7 5.3 0 283.8 
8 1999 (including only all debt holders) 4,987 1.3 7 .001 283.8 
9 2005 (including all) 2,496 1.7 31.4 0 1,511 
10 2005 (including only all debt holders) 1,408 3.1 41.8 .001 1,511 
11 2012 (including all) 4,813 .9 6.6 0 193.3 
12 2012 (including only all debt holders) 2,746 1.6 8.6 .001 193.3 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security
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Table 3.3: Debt-income and debt-asset ratios in 1999, 2005, and 2012 for households with an income 
level between $40K and $60K (including) per year  
      
Row  
Debt-income ratio 
Number of 
observations 
Mean  
Std. 
dev.  
Minimum 
ratio  
Maximum 
ratio  
1 1999 (including all) 2,538 .97 1.2 0 10.7 
2 1999 (including only all debt 
holders) 
2,086 1.2 1.2 .001 10.7 
3 2005 (including all) 752 1.3 1.9 0 19.9 
4 2005 (including only all debt 
holders) 
595 1.6 2 .005 19.9 
5 2012 (including all) 1,713 1.5 3 0 67.9 
6 2012 (including only all debt 
holders) 
1,291 2 3.3 .001 67.9 
 Debt-asset ratio      
7 1999 (including all) 2,538 .3 .9 0 33.7 
8 1999 (including only all debt 
holders) 
2,086 .4 .98 .001 33.7 
9 2005 (including all) 752 .3 1.2 0 28.4 
10 2005 (including only all debt 
holders) 
595 .4 1.3 .001 28.4 
11 2012 (including all) 1,713 .3 1.7 0 67.5 
12 2012 (including only all debt 
holders) 
1,291 .4 1.9 .001 67.5 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Debt-income and debt-asset ratios in 1999, 2005, and 2012 for households with an income 
level between $60K and $80K (including) per year  
      
Row  
Debt-income ratio 
Number of 
observations 
Mean  
Std. 
dev.  
Minimum 
ratio  
Maximum 
ratio  
1 1999 (including all) 1,613 .87 .90 0 5.38 
2 1999 (including only all debt holders) 1,341 1.04 .89 .0002 5.38 
3 2005 (including all) 572 1.14 1.32 0 15.5 
4 2005 (including only all debt holders) 479 1.37 1.34 .001 15.5 
5 2012 (including all) 1,348 1.54 2.47 0 42.7 
6 2012 (including only all debt holders) 1,098 1.89 2.62 .00001 42.7 
 Debt-asset ratio      
7 1999 (including all) 1,613 .27 .59 0 20.1 
8 1999 (including only all debt holders) 1,341 .32 .63 .0001 20.1 
9 2005 (including all) 572 .39 1.26 0 18.9 
10 2005 (including only all debt holders) 479 .46 1.36 .0003 18.9 
11 2012 (including all) 1,348 .28 .44 0 8.71 
12 2012 (including only all debt holders) 1,098 .34 .46 .0001 8.71 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Table 3.5: Debt-income and debt-asset ratios in 1999, 2005, and 2012 for households with an income 
level between $80K and $100K (including) per year  
      
Row  
Debt-income ratio 
Number of 
observations 
Mean  
Std. 
dev.  
Minimum 
ratio  
Maximum 
ratio  
1 1999 (including all) 1,029 .76 .71 0 4.39 
2 1999 (including only all debt holders) 875 .89 .69 .001 4.39 
3 2005 (including all) 409 1.04 1.11 0 6.73 
4 2005 (including only all debt holders) 345 1.23 1.11 .003 6.73 
5 2012 (including all) 1,145 1.46 1.99 0 22.4 
6 2012 (including only all debt holders) 945 1.77 2.06 .0001 22.4 
 Debt-asset ratio      
7 1999 (including all) 1,029 .22 .24 0 2.84 
8 1999 (including only all debt holders) 875 .26 .24 .0001 2.84 
9 2005 (including all) 409 .23 .25 0 1.36 
10 2005 (including only all debt holders) 345 .28 .25 .001 1.36 
11 2012 (including all) 1,145 .25 .31 0 4.52 
12 2012 (including only all debt holders) 945 .30 .32 .00002 4.52 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Debt-income and debt-asset ratios in 1999, 2005, and 2012 for households with an income 
level between $100K and $150K (including) per year  
      
Row  
Debt-income ratio 
Number of 
observations 
Mean  
Std. 
dev.  
Minimum 
ratio  
Maximum 
ratio  
1 1999 (including all) 864 .66 .74 0 6.35 
2 1999 (including only all debt holders) 714 .80 .74 .001 6.35 
3 2005 (including all) 479 .94 1.18 0 13.7 
4 2005 (including only all debt holders) 387 1.17 1.21 .004 13.7 
5 2012 (including all) 1,513 1.25 1.48 0 15.7 
6 2012 (including only all debt holders) 1,263 1.50 1.49 0.00001 15.7 
 Debt-asset ratio      
7 1999 (including all) 864 .17 .20 0 1.95 
8 1999 (including only all debt holders) 714 .21 .20 .0004 1.95 
9 2005 (including all) 479 .20 .25 0 3.09 
10 2005 (including only all debt holders) 387 .25 .26 .001 3.09 
11 2012 (including all) 1,513 .22 .32 0 8.09 
12 2012 (including only all debt holders) 1,263 .27 .34 .00001 8.09 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Table 3.7: Debt-income and debt-asset ratios in 1999, 2005, and 2012 for households with an income 
level greater than $150K (including) per year  
      
Row  
Debt-income ratio 
Number of 
observations 
Mean  
Std. 
dev.  
Minimum 
ratio  
Maximum 
ratio  
1 1999 (including all) 590 .47 .59 0 3.98 
2 1999 (including only all debt holders) 419 .67 .60 .001 3.98 
3 2005 (including all) 535 .61 1.01 0 9.94 
4 2005 (including only all debt holders) 364 .90 1.12 .002 9.94 
5 2012 (including all) 1,412 .93 1.29 0 13.2 
6 2012 (including only all debt holders) 1,087 1.21 1.35 .0001 13.2 
 Debt-asset ratio      
7 1999 (including all) 590 .12 .19 0 3.16 
8 1999 (including only all debt holders) 419 .17 .21 .001 3.16 
9 2005 (including all) 535 .10 .15 0 .85 
10 2005 (including only all debt holders) 364 .15 .16 .0004 .85 
11 2012 (including all) 1,412 .15 .37 0 12.1 
12 2012 (including only all debt holders) 1,087 .20 .41 .000003 12.1 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8: Summary of the average debt-income and debt-asset ratios from tables 2-7 
Row Year Type of 
Income 
Earners 
Income 
less than 
$40K 
Income 
$40K-$60K 
Income 
60K-80K 
Income 
80K-100K 
Income 
100K-150K 
Income 
greater 
than 150K 
Debt / Income 
1 1999 All 4.3 .97 .87 .76 .66 .47 
2 1999 Debt holders 7.1 1.2 1.04 .89 .80 .67 
3 2005 All 4.3 1.3 1.14 1.04 .94 .61 
4 2005 Debt holders 7.2 1.6 1.37 1.23 1.17 .90 
5 2012 All 6 1.5 1.54 1.46 1.25 .93 
6 2012 Debt holders 11.7 2 1.89 1.77 1.5 1.21 
Debt / Asset 
7 1999 All .7 .3 .27 .22 .17 .12 
8 1999 Debt holders 1.3 .4 .32 .26 .21 .17 
9 2005 All 1.7 .3 .39 .23 .20 .10 
10 2005 Debt holders 3.1 .4 .46 .28 .25 .15 
11 2012 All .9 .3 .28 .25 .22 .15 
12 2012 Debt holders 1.6 .4 .34 .30 .27 .20 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Figures 
Figure 3.1: Average debt-income ratio across different income levels in 1999, 2005, and 2012 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
 
Figure 3.2: Average debt-asset ratio across different income levels in 1999, 2005, and 2012 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Figure 3.3: Average total debts (K) across different income levels in 1999, 2005, and 2012 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
 
Figure 3.4: Average total assets (K) across different income levels in 1999, 2005, and 2012 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Figure 3.5: Average ratio of different types of debts to total debts (%) in 1999 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Average ratio of different types of debts to total debts (%) in 1999 - except mortgages 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
42.4 
40.4 
38 
35.5 
40 
33.9 
34.1 
36.4 36.8 37.5 35.2 
38.5 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Credit card
Line of credit
Mortgage on non-principle
residence
Mortgage on principle
residence
Other loans from financial
institutions
Student loan
Vehicle loan
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.3 
5.6 
6.1 
5.9 
6.9 
7.3 
9 
3.9 
4.7 
6.3 
7.1 
6.6 
10.3 
6.8 
5.1 4.9 4.6 
4.1 
2 
5.6 5.7 
6.4 6.5 
5.1 4.9 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Credit card
Line of credit
Other loans from financial
institutions
Student loan
Vehicle loan
 83 
 
Figure 3.7: Average ratio of different types of debts to total debts (%) in 2005 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Average ratio of different types of debts to total debts (%) in 2005 – except mortgagees 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Figure 3.9: Average ratio of different types of debts to total debts (%) in 2012 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Average ratio of different types of debts to total debts (%) in 2012 – except mortgages 
 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
By using “occupational position” variable in GSOEP, blue-collar, white-collar, and civil service 
workers are categorized as follows: 
Blue-collar worker:   
1. Untrained Worker 
2. Semi-Trained Worker 
3. Trained Worker 
4. Forman, Team Leader 
5. Forman (Master craftsman) 
White- collar worker: 
1. W-Collar Worker With Simple Tasks 
2. Untrained W-Collar Worker With Simple Tasks 
3. Trained W-Collar Worker With Simple Tasks 
4. Qualified Professional 
5. H. Qualified Professional 
6. Managerial 
Civil service worker: 
1. Low-level Civil Service 
2. Middle-Level Civil Service 
3. High-Level Civil Service 
4. Executive-Level Civil Service 
 
Based on these three types of workers, I define four job levels following Lluis (2005): 
Low-level Job: Blue-collar 1, 2   and White-collar 1, 2, 3 and Civil servant 1. 
Middle-level Job: Blue-collar 3 and White-collar 4 and Civil servant 2. 
High-level Job: Blue-collar 4 and White-collar 5 and Civil servant 3. 
Executive-level Job: Blue-collar 5 and White-collar 6 and Civil servant 4. 
 92 
 
Appendix B (Structure of Education System in Germany) 
Tremblay and Le Bot (2003) explain the complex structure of education system in Germany that 
is summarized in the following chart. Based on this educational chart, German children stay in 
kindergarten from 3 to 6 years-old but kindergarten is optional. Then the compulsory primary 
school starts at the age of 6 and it usually lasts for four years. At the age of 10, all students start a 
two-year orientation stage in which they decide how to continue their education. From this stage, 
there are three different types of high schools (Secondary Level I). Each type of secondary level 
I is classified based on the future occupational careers and starts at the age of 12 and lasts for 
three or four years. 
1- Some students enter Lower Secondary School, end of compulsory education (Hauptschulen) 
as the secondary level I which lasts for three years. If these students would like to continue 
studying more than secondary level I, they have different options in vocational schools or the 
dual system (on-the-job training and vocational school). 
2- Some other students start in General Education School (Realschulen or Mittelschulen) after 
the orientation stage which lasts for four years. Many higher education options are available 
beyond this level of secondary education in Higher Technical Schools (Fachoberschulen) and 
Integrated Universities (Administration Fachhoschulen) which are all at a lower level than 
university. In fact, after 6 years of studying in Realschule and receiving the Intermediate 
Education Certificate (Mittlere Reife), students are able to pursue their studies in a higher 
technical school and then they can have access to specialized university colleges or 
integrated universities. These institutions are less academic than traditional universities, but 
they have more occupational oriented programs such as civil engineering. 
3- The third group of students enter a more academic high school, a Grammar School 
(Gymnasien), which ends with a university entrance certificate (Abitur). This path of high 
school (Secondary Levels I and II) is the most direct path to university and it lasts six to 
seven years after the orientation stage. 
At the age of 15 or 16, different training schools, intermediate education Certificate, or grammar 
schools are provided based on what path the student has chosen. Higher technical schools, 
colleges, or universities are the next levels of education at the age of 18 or 19. The summary of 
theses educational paths are illustrated in the following page. 
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     Structure of the Education System in the Federal Republic of Germany 
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Reference: Tremblay and Le Bot (2003), page 8.
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Appendix C 
The variables “School-Leaving Degree” (SLD) and “Amount of Education or Training in Years” 
(AETY) in GSOEP data have been used to present the distribution of workers’ education level in 
the sample. Following table shows this distribution and how I define the education categories. 
There are 7 to 18 years of education in the sample and seven groups of School-Leaving Degree 
(SLD) as follows: 
1. Secondary School Degree (Hauptschlabschluss) 
2. Intermediate School Degree (Realschulabschluss) 
3. Technical School Degree (Fachhochschulreife) 
4. Upper Secondary Degree (Abitur) 
5. Other Degree (Anderer Abschluss) 
6. Dropout, No School Degree (Ohne Abschluss verlassen) 
7. In School, No school Degree Yet (In Schulausbildung) 
 
 
Table 1.20: Frequencies of workers holding different School-Leaving Degree (SLD) and years of  
                     education 
  Frequencies of workers in School-Leaving Degree (SLD)  
Education 
Degree 
Years of 
Education 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] [6] [7] 
 
Total 
 
 
LHS 
7 0 0 0 0 0 3,821 1 3,822 
8.5 0 0 0 0 0 439 1 440 
9 6,577 0 0 0 4,333 558 0 11,468 
10 0 2,420 0 0 691 46 0 3,157 
 
HS 
10.5 25,821 0 0 0 993 0 0 26,814 
11 6,236 0 0 0 2,583 0 0 8,819 
11.5 0 23,780 0 0 573 0 0 24,353 
 
 
 
 
TCU 
12 386 8,433 282 0 1,164 36 0 10,301 
13 0 4,150 0 912 234 0 0 5,296 
13.5 0 0 1,435 0 0 0 0 1,435 
14 95 0 1,362 0 104 0 0 1,561 
14.5 0 0 0 3,208 0 0 0 3,208 
15 0 670 2,454 1,575 810 0 0 5,509 
16 0 0 0 3,512 0 0 0 3,512 
17 0 0 462 0 0 0 0 462 
GRAD 18 0 0 0 13,381 0 0 0 13,381 
Obs.  39,115 39,453 5,995 22,588 11,485 4,900 2 123,538 
[1] Secondary school degree (Hauptschulabschluss), [2] Intermediate school degree (Realschulabschluss), [3] Technical school 
degree (Fachhochschulreife), [4] Upper secondary degree (Abitur), [5] Other degree, [6] No school degree (dropout), [7] In 
school. 
LHS: Less than High School, HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree. 
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By comparing this Table 1.20 with the education chart in appendix B, I explain how I 
categorize four education groups. 
Less than high school degree holders are holding, 
 A secondary school degree and 9 years of education (see column 1). These people are the ones 
who have finished their lower secondary school level (type 1 of Secondary School I in 
appendix B).  
 An intermediate school degree with 10 years of education (see column 2). 
 Any other degree with 10 years of education or less (see column 5 and 6). 
High school degree holders are holding, 
 A vocational or technical degree after the secondary school degree with 10.5 or 11 years of 
education (see column 1). 
 An intermediate school degree in addition to 11.5 years of education (see column 2). 
 Any other degree with the years of education 10-12 (see column 5 and 6). 
Technical, College, or University degree holders are holding, 
 Any kind of technical, college, or university degree with the years of education between 12 
(including) and 18 (see column 1-5). 
Graduate degree holders are holding, 
 A university degree and at least 18 years of education. 
 
In summary, I define four education degrees based on the number of years of education (YE) as 
follows: 
 Less than High School (LHS) (YE≤10) 
 High School degree (HS) (10< YE <12) 
 Technical, College, or University degree (TCU) (12≤ YE <18) 
 Graduate degree (GRAD) (18≤ YE) 
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Appendix D (Sensitivity Analysis) 
 
 
 
Table 1.21: Marginal effects in fixed-effect estimations among different promotion levels (St.E) 
Dependent Variables Total Promotion 
 
Promotion level 1 Promotion level 2 Promotion level 3 
      HS .310* 
(.214) 
-.064 
(.332) 
.587* 
(.362) 
1.33* 
(.949) 
      TCU .497* 
(.281) 
.347 
(.509) 
.481 
(.447) 
.893 
(1.06) 
      GRAD .641 
(.513) 
16.2 
(39.5) 
.102 
(.902) 
2.32* 
(1.50) 
      Training .417 
(.390) 
1.01* 
(.575) 
-.415 
(.666) 
.919 
(1.42) 
Training     
      x  HS -.101 
(.403) 
-.691 
(.597) 
.649 
(.685) 
-.383 
(1.45) 
      x  TCU -.351 
(.411) 
-.286 
(.719) 
.007 
(.696) 
-.216 
(1.44) 
      x  GRAD -.198 
(.446) 
 .191 
(.797) 
-.370 
(1.44) 
      x  Female -.131 
(.189) 
-.270 
(.408) 
.506* 
(.296) 
-1.21** 
(.504) 
Individual-specific, job-
specific, state of 
residence, and year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,177 2,817 3,937 1,570 
Note: 1) Total promotion includes all three promotion levels; promotion level 1 is defined as a change from a low to a middle-
level job; promotion level 2 is a change from a low or middle-level job to a high-level job; and promotion level 3 is a change 
from any lower level job to an executive level job. 2)  HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, 
GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less than High School. 
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Table 1.22: Marginal effects of random -effect estimations among different promotion levels including previous  
                     year promotion indicator  (St.E) 
Dependent Variables Total Promotion 
 
Promotion level 1 Promotion level 2 Promotion level 3 
      HS .042*** 
(.004) 
.086*** 
(.009) 
.001 
(.003) 
.002 
(.002) 
      TCU .065*** 
(.005) 
.095*** 
(.012) 
.016*** 
(.003) 
.005** 
(.002) 
      GRAD .099*** 
(.006) 
.039 
(.039) 
.045*** 
(.005) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
      Training .043*** 
(.014) 
.104*** 
(.034) 
.004 
(.010) 
.001 
(.007) 
      Female -.027*** 
(.003) 
-.038*** 
(.009) 
-.012*** 
(.002) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
Training     
      x  HS -.028* 
(.015) 
-.076** 
(.035) 
.003 
(.010) 
.0003 
(.007) 
      x  TCU -.039*** 
(.015) 
-.054 
(.039) 
-.006 
(.011) 
-.0002 
(.007) 
      x  GRAD -.044*** 
(.016) 
.129 
(.102) 
-.009 
(.012) 
.0001 
(.007) 
      x  Female .004 
(.006) 
-.0005 
(.022) 
.003 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.002) 
Previous promotion 
indicator 
.111*** 
(.004) 
.183*** 
(.013) 
.040*** 
(.003) 
.012*** 
(.002) 
Individual-specific, 
job-specific, state of 
residence, and year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,196 14,220 40,605 39,976 
Note: 1) Total promotion includes all three promotion levels; promotion level 1 is defined as a change from a low to a middle-
level job; promotion level 2 is a change from a low or middle-level job to a high-level job; and promotion level 3 is a change 
from any lower level job to an executive level job. 2)  HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, 
GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less than High School. 
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Table 1.23: Marginal effects in mixed-effect estimations among different promotion levels (St.E) 
Dependent Variables Total Promotion 
 
Promotion level 1 Promotion level 2 Promotion level 3 
      HS .002 
(.003) 
.092*** 
(.010) 
.002 
(.002) 
.001 
(.002) 
      TCU .019*** 
(.004) 
.105*** 
(.013) 
.015*** 
(.003) 
.004** 
(.002) 
      GRAD .039*** 
(.005) 
.063* 
(.042) 
.042*** 
(.004) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
      Training .003 
(.012) 
.107*** 
(.034) 
.004 
(.009) 
.001 
(.007) 
      Female -.013*** 
(.002) 
-.042*** 
(.010) 
-.011*** 
(.002) 
-.001** 
(.001) 
Training     
      x  HS .005 
(.012) 
-.075** 
(.036) 
.001 
(.009) 
.0005 
(.008) 
      x  TCU -.003 
(.012) 
-.054 
(.040) 
-.006 
(.009) 
-.0003 
(.006) 
      x  GRAD -.004 
(.013) 
.111 
(.111) 
-.008 
(.010) 
.0002 
(.006) 
      x  Female -.002 
(.004) 
-.006 
(.023) 
.003 
(.004) 
-.003 
(.001) 
Individual-specific, 
job-specific, state of 
residence, and year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,196 14,220 40,605 39,976 
Note: 1) Total promotion includes all three promotion levels; promotion level 1 is defined as a change from a low to a middle-
level job; promotion level 2 is a change from a low or middle-level job to a high-level job; and promotion level 3 is a change 
from any lower level job to an executive level job.2)  HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, 
GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less than High School. 
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Table 1.24: Random-effect estimates of change in log-wage for different promotion levels versus no promotions at each level (St.E) 
 Total  
Promotion 
(1) 
No Total 
Promotion 
(2) 
 Promotion 
Level 1 
(3) 
No Promotion 
level 1 
(4) 
 Promotion 
Level 2 
(5) 
No Promotion 
level 2 
(6) 
 Promotion 
Level 3 
(7) 
No Promotion 
level 3 
(8) 
       HS .012 
(.012) 
.010*** 
(.003) 
 .020* 
(.013) 
.012*** 
(.005) 
 -.005 
(.025) 
.020*** 
(.003) 
 -.092* 
(.067) 
.006 
(.005) 
      TCU .031** 
(.014) 
.041*** 
(.004) 
 .030* 
(.017) 
.026*** 
(.008) 
 -.012 
(.027) 
.041*** 
(.004) 
 -.073 
(.071) 
.030*** 
(.005) 
      
GRAD 
.121*** 
(.019) 
.128*** 
(.006) 
 .079* 
(.047) 
.042* 
(.030) 
 .050* 
(.034) 
.103*** 
(.011) 
 .046 
(.077) 
.106*** 
(.006) 
      
Training 
.018 
(.014) 
.010*** 
(.003) 
 .047** 
(.021) 
.024** 
(.011) 
 -.021 
(.023) 
.009** 
(.004) 
 .018 
(.042) 
.006* 
(.004) 
      
Female 
-.037*** 
(.010) 
-.066*** 
(.003) 
 -.051*** 
(.012) 
-.105*** 
(.006) 
 -.028* 
(.017) 
-.083*** 
(.003) 
 -.007 
(.033) 
-.061*** 
(.003) 
Training            
     x  HS -.013 
(.018) 
.004 
(.005) 
 -.048* 
(.025) 
.005* 
(.015) 
 .020 
(.030) 
.001 
(.005) 
 .065 
(.057) 
.003 
(.005) 
     x  
TCU 
.017 
(.022) 
.008* 
(.005) 
 .020 
(.037) 
.018 
(.024) 
 .024 
(.032) 
.011* 
(.007) 
 .029 
(.058) 
.006 
(.005) 
     x  
GRAD 
-.003 
(.031) 
-.002 
(.007) 
 -.111 
(.099) 
.265** 
(.137) 
 .024 
(.052) 
.013 
(.019) 
 -.006 
(.047) 
-.003 
(.007) 
     x  
Female 
.004 
(.022) 
.001 
(.005) 
 .021 
(.031) 
-.005 
(.018) 
 .010 
(.039) 
.006 
(.007) 
 .014 
(.075) 
.004 
(.006) 
Constant .088 
(.079) 
.175*** 
(.023) 
 .145* 
(.100) 
.333*** 
(.042) 
 .073 
(.149) 
.233*** 
(.027) 
 .554** 
(.278) 
.161*** 
(.027) 
Individual
-specific 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupatio
n 
dummies 
No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Job 
transition 
dummies 
Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observati
ons 
3,840 50,356  1,828 12,392  1,454 39,151  531 39,445 
Notes- 1) The samples in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) include only promoted employees and the sample in columns (2), (4), (6),  and (8) include non-promoted employees in all 
promotion levels. Promotion level 1: promotion from low level to middle level jobs; promotion level 2: promotion from low or middle level jobs to high level jobs; promotion 
level 3: promotion from any lower levels to executive level jobs.  
2) HS: High School Degree, TCU: Technical, College, or University degree, GRAD: Graduate degree, and LHS: Less than High School (reference group).  
         * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; *** statistically significant at the 1% level
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Appendix E 
There are three post-unemployment possibilities for people who have become unemployed and received UI benefits: the possibilities of finding a job, 
staying unemployed, or going out of labour force after using UI benefits. In each of these three cases, an individual may be eligible for welfare. If they get 
employed after their unemployment, but the level of their household income and assets are still below a required threshold for welfare, they may apply for and 
receive welfare benefits. In the second case, those who have used UI benefits are still unemployed and need assistance. They also may join the welfare program. 
Finally, some people go out of labour force and stop searching for job after they finish their UI benefits. This group also might be the claimants of welfare 
benefits. In all these three scenarios, people may join a welfare program at the same year, one year, or more years after they receive UI benefits. It is also possible 
that some people join their second UI spell once they become employed after using UI benefits, and all these possibilities are also valid after multiple UI use. 
 
 
* Employed: working, maternity leave, second job  
** Still unemployed: not working and unemployed but looking for job 
*** Not in the Labour Force: not working, age 65 and over, in education or training, in military-community service
Unemployed 
Unemployed and UI 
benefits 
1) Employed* 
Employed and No 
welfare  
Unemployed and 
second UI benefit 
Employed and welfare 
(at the time of UI use 
or any years after) 
Unemployed and 
second UI benefit 
2) Still unemployed**  
Unemployed and No 
welfare 
Unemployed and 
welfare (at the time of 
UI use or any years 
after) 
3) Not in the LF***  
Not in LF and welfare   
(at the time of UI use 
or any years after) 
Not in LF and No 
welfare  
Unemployed and No UI 
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Appendix F 
To explain the hazard rate of joining welfare, let 𝑇 ≥ 0 denote the time over which a UI 
user joins welfare, or other post-unemployment possibilities. Then, F(t|x) = P(T ≤ t|X = x) is 
the cumulative distribution function of T and the survivor function is defined as 𝑆(𝑡) = 1 −
𝐹(𝑡), which gives the probability of “surviving” past time t. Then, the density function of T will 
be 𝑓(𝑡) =
𝑑𝐹(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
, and for h>0, Pr (𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + ℎ|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡) is the probability of joining welfare 
between t and t+h given survival up to time t. Given all this information, the hazard function for 
T is defined as following function. 
𝜆(𝑡) = lim
ℎ→∞
Pr (𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + ℎ|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡)
ℎ
 
The numerator of the above function which is a conditional probability can be defined as 
follows. 
Pr(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + ℎ|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡) =
Pr (𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + ℎ)
Pr (𝑇 ≥ 𝑡)
=
𝐹(𝑡 + ℎ) − 𝐹(𝑡)
1 − 𝐹(𝑡)
 
So that, the hazard function or hazard rate will change to the ratio of the probability density 
function 𝑓(𝑡) to the survival function 𝑆(𝑡) as follows. 
𝜆(𝑡) = lim
ℎ→0
𝐹(𝑡 + ℎ) − 𝐹(𝑡)
ℎ
1
1 − 𝐹(𝑡)
=
𝑓(𝑡)
1 − 𝐹(𝑡)
=
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
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Appendix G 
In this study, the Cox-proportional hazard model is written as a general form.  
𝜆(𝑡) = 𝜆0(𝑡) ∗ exp [𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋]                           (1) 
Where the baseline hazard rate is λ0(t), Hartz is a dummy variable taking a value of one for 
individuals who have used UI benefits between 2006 and 2009. The dummy variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
indicates the treatment group that specifies the UI users who are 45-60 year-old. By adding an 
interaction term between the dummy variables Hartz and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡, I can estimate the treatment 
effect. 
First I take the logarithm of both sides to make the equation (1) linear. 
ln 𝜆(𝑡) = ln 𝜆0(𝑡) + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋                           (2) 
Then considering four cases of control and treatment groups before and after the Hartz reforms, I 
rewrite the equation (2). 
For the control group before the Hartz reforms, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 0 and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 = 0, equation (2) changes 
as follows. 
ln 𝜆𝐶𝐵(𝑡) = ln 𝜆0(𝑡) + 𝛾
′𝑋                                                                                                           (3) 
And for the control group after the Hartz reforms, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 0 and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 = 1, equation (2) 
changes to equation (4) as follows. 
ln 𝜆𝐶𝐴(𝑡) = ln 𝜆0(𝑡) + 𝛽1 + 𝛾
′𝑋                                                                                                   (4) 
The equation (5) presents the difference between the logarithm of hazard rates of control group 
before and after the Hartz reforms by deducting equation (3) from equation (4). 
ln 𝜆𝐶𝐴(𝑡) − ln 𝜆𝐶𝐵(𝑡) = 𝛽1                                                                                                            (5) 
For the treatment group before the Hartz reforms, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 1 and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 = 0, equation (2) 
changes as follows. 
ln 𝜆𝑇𝐵(𝑡) = ln 𝜆0(𝑡) + 𝛽2 + 𝛾
′𝑋                                                                                                  (6) 
And for the treatment group after the Hartz reforms, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 0 and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧 = 1, equation (2) 
changes to equation (4) as follows. 
ln 𝜆𝑇𝐴(𝑡) = ln 𝜆0(𝑡) + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽12 + 𝛾
′𝑋                                                                               (7) 
Equation (8) now presents the difference between the logarithm of hazard rates of treatment 
group before and after the Hartz reforms by deducting equation (6) from equation (7). 
ln 𝜆𝑇𝐴(𝑡) − ln 𝜆𝑇𝐵(𝑡) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽12                                                                                                 (8) 
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The treatment effect or difference-in-differences can then be obtained in equation (9) by 
deducting equation (5) from equation (8).  
[ln 𝜆𝑇𝐴(𝑡) − ln 𝜆𝑇𝐵(𝑡)] − [ln 𝜆𝐶𝐴(𝑡) − ln 𝜆𝐶𝐵(𝑡)] = 𝛽12                                                            (9) 
By rewriting equation (9), the hazard ratio of joining welfare for treatment group versus control 
group before and after the reforms can be calculated as follows. 
𝜆𝑇𝐴(𝑡)
𝜆𝑇𝐵(𝑡)
𝜆𝐶𝐴(𝑡)
𝜆𝐶𝐵(𝑡)
= 𝑒𝛽12                                                                                                                    (10) 
Therefore, I first estimate the coefficients of equation (1) and then the hazard ratios of joining 
welfare for two groups will be calculated by using the coefficient of the interaction term. 
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Appendix H 
Table 3.9: Statistics description of different types of debts, total debts, total income, and total assets 
from the 1999, 2005, and 2012 cycles of Survey of Financial Security for households with an income 
level below $40K (including) per year  
Debt Variables 
Number of 
observations  
Mean ($) Std. dev. ($) 
Minimum 
amount ($) 
Maximum 
amount ($) 
a) 1999 
Mortgage on principal residence 1,609 56,207 48,073 375 400,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 201 69,943 60,443 50 300,000 
Credit card 2,908 2,449 3,255 1 38,000 
Student loan 933 11,195 11,114 30 80,000 
Vehicle loan 1,358 9,271 8,376 125 70,000 
Line of credit  652 9,250 19,585 20 150,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 1,357 6,471 14,969 1 150,000 
Total debts in 1999 4,987 29,971 46,652 1 621,200 
Total market income in 1999 7,556 18,020 11,813 1 40,000 
Total assets in 1999 8,807 167,627 264,251 175 5,555,000 
b) 2005 
Mortgage on principal residence 430 77,334 93,906 2,000 1,450,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 63 123,600 147,097 2,000 1,450,000 
Credit card 778 4,011 6,266 5 52,500 
Student loan 248 14,126 12,811 275 62,500 
Vehicle loan 434 10,608 8,992 250 55,000 
Line of credit  337 16,292 28,212 50 280,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 316 10,300 29,146 1 340,000 
Total debts in 2005 1,408 43,333 90,776 1 1,700,000 
Total market income in 2005 2,121 19,156 11,895 25 40,000 
Total assets in 2005 2,496 258,453 869,234 175 34,900,000 
c) 2012      
Mortgage on principal residence 748 117,503 124,210 1 1,500,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 123 150,508 215,490 500 1,850,000 
Credit card 1,468 4,766 7,747 1 95,000 
Student loan 424 16,898      18,211        80 105,000 
Vehicle loan 900 13,749 13,243 1 160,000 
Line of credit  667 25,386 54,438 1 650,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 556 9,822 20,520 1 260,000 
Total debts in 2012 2,746 56,568 110,527 1 1,850,000 
Total market income in 2012 4,047 19,141 12,083 25 40,000 
Total assets in 2012 4,813 335,801 524,717 175 8,602,000 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Table 3.10: Statistics description of different types of debts, total debts, total income, and total 
assets from the 1999, 2005, and 2012 cycles of Survey of Financial Security for households with  
an income level between $40K and $60K (including) per year 
Debt Variables 
Number of 
observations  
Mean ($) Std. dev. ($) 
Minimum 
amount ($) 
Maximum 
amount ($) 
a) 1999 
Mortgage on principal residence 1,204 $69,533 $48,367 $800 $400,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 150 $77,206 $68,118 $1,150 $300,000 
Credit card 1,258 $3,145 $3,653 $20 $29,000 
Student loan 306 $9,787 $9,411 $50 $48,000 
Vehicle loan 827 $10,811 $8,154 $30 $57,500 
Line of credit  543 $11,648 $19,919 $30 $150,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 526 $8,987 $14,622 $2 $150,000 
Total debts in 1999 2,086 $48,165 $59,626 $0 $480,000 
Total market income in 1999 2,538 $49,613 $5,891 $40,025 $60,000 
Total assets in 1999 2,538 $305,903 $375,267 $200 $4,155,000 
b) 2005 
Mortgage on principal residence 315 95,328 72,157 750 575,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 50 116,445 169,958 4,750 1,100,000 
Credit card 330 5,277 6,493 30 38,000 
Student loan 85 11,366 10,967 800 57,500 
Vehicle loan 238 13,074 9,528 325 55,000 
Line of credit  240 18,978 36,825 80 320,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 123 21,116 51,436 200 340,000 
Total debts in 2005 595 82,053 106,021 250 1,195,000 
Total market income in 2005 752 50,245 6,078 41,000 60,000 
Total assets in 2005 752 462,138 769,556 475 15,300,000 
c) 2012      
Mortgage on principal residence 629 127,424 117,478 1 1,600,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 96 186,499 278,007 1,500 1,850,000 
Credit card 730 5,506 7,500 1 55,000 
Student loan 198 13,197 14,065 250 90,000 
Vehicle loan 597 16,209 13,216 1 95,000 
Line of credit  445 36,758 75,974 30 700,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 222 11,197 24,089 1 270,000 
Total debts in 2012 1,291 103,180 163,899 1 3,125,000 
Total market income in 2012 1,713 50,652 6,009 41,000 60,000 
Total assets in 2012 1,713 651,982 768,748 200 10,100,000 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Table 3.11: Statistics description of different types of debts, total debts, total income, and total 
assets from the 1999, 2005, and 2012 cycles of Survey of Financial Security for households with  
an income level between $60K and $80K (including) per year  
Debt Variables 
Number of 
observations  
Mean ($) Std. dev. ($) 
Minimum 
amount ($) 
Maximum 
amount ($) 
a) 1999 
Mortgage on principal residence 865 76,722 47,261 225 310,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 109 79,121 66,645 450 300,000 
Credit card 771 3,552 3,964 20 32,000 
Student loan 179 10,138 10,227 40 80,000 
Vehicle loan 536 13,315 10,536 150 72,500 
Line of credit  422 12,274 21,632 175 145,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 341 13,191 19,518 1 150,000 
Total debts in 1999 1,341 71,855 62,042 20 421,250 
Total market income in 1999 1,613 69,137 5,604 60,025 80,000 
Total assets in 1999 1,613 410,276 466,300 385 6,778,500 
b) 2005 
Mortgage on principal residence 306 108,568 77,618 2,000 490,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 30 92,355 97,010 3,900 475,000 
Credit card 278 5,953 7,184 30 46,000 
Student loan 80 13,156 14,949 375 62,500 
Vehicle loan 221 13,257 8,791 400 52,500 
Line of credit  213 18,257 25,943 80 180,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 107 12,849 18,154 150 115,000 
Total debts in 2005 479 97,899 94,267 80 1,009,500 
Total market income in 2005 572 71,276 5,641 62,500 80,000 
Total assets in 2005 572 534,811 684,676 1,250 7,559,500 
c) 2012      
Mortgage on principal residence 628 146,420 114,950 1 1,550,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 106 223,290 345,407 1 1,900,000 
Credit card 621 6,209 8,651 6 65,000 
Student loan 146 14,922 17,101 30 110,000 
Vehicle loan 544 17,061 13,281 350 75,000 
Line of credit  449 30,307 49,126 1 410,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 182 15,335 30,414 2 280,000 
Total debts in 2012 1,098 134,184 182,357 1 2,779,000 
Total market income in 2012 1,348 71,165 5,745 62,500 80,000 
Total assets in 2012 1,348 785,154 1,028,333 250 15,800,000 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Table 3.12: Statistics description of different types of debts, total debts, total income, and total 
assets from the 1999, 2005, and 2012 cycles of Survey of Financial Security for households with  
an income level between $80K and $100K (including) per year  
Debt Variables 
Number of 
observations  
Mean ($) Std. dev. ($) 
Minimum 
amount ($) 
Maximum 
amount ($) 
a) 1999 
Mortgage on principal 
residence 590 80,120 47,549 1,900 270,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 85 75,857 57,339 1,000 300,000 
Credit card 488 3,842 4,384 50 37,000 
Student loan 118 9,854 10,662 525 80,000 
Vehicle loan 375 13,938 10,110 725 70,000 
Line of credit  309 14,669 23,129 50 150,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 191 15,252 24,440 80 150,000 
Total debts in 1999 875 79,347 61,942 60 397,500 
Total market income in 1999 1,029 89,359 5,786 80,025 100,000 
Total assets in 1999 1,029 491,301 433,293 270 3,965,600 
b) 2005 
Mortgage on principal 
residence 239 109,163 83,084 3,300 550,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 22 121,114 100,523 20,000 410,000 
Credit card 197 5,964 6,746 40 41,000 
Student loan 45 11,804 11,865 475 47,000 
Vehicle loan 152 16,790 11,986 325 67,500 
Line of credit  172 22,854 30,370 250 200,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 70 27,184 50,601 125 340,000 
Total debts in 2005 345 112,598 103,267 250 672,775 
Total market income in 2005 409 91,229 5,944 82,500 100,000 
Total assets in 2005 409 673,965 641,331 11,000 5,642,150 
c) 2012      
Mortgage on principal 
residence 593 156,126 109,689 1 675,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 115 224,138 311,295 3,900 1,950,000 
Credit card 514 6,888 9,487 5 75,000 
Student loan 133 13,113 12,736 350 72,500 
Vehicle loan 528 19,311 14,992 1 105,000 
Line of credit  441 38,310 66,583 1 800,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 131 14,378 24,388 1 205,000 
Total debts in 2012 945 161,500 188,681 1 2,125,000 
Total market income in 2012 1,145 91,441 5,903 82,500 100,000 
Total assets in 2012 1,145 965,982 1,107,616 1,030 12,300,000 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Table 3.13: Statistics description of different types of debts, total debts, total income, and total 
assets from the 1999, 2005, and 2012 cycles of Survey of Financial Security for households with  
an income level between $100K and $150K (including) per year  
Debt Variables 
Number of 
observations  
Mean ($) Std. dev. ($) 
Minimum 
amount ($) 
Maximum 
amount ($) 
a) 1999 
Mortgage on principal 
residence 480 95,004 64,799 1,000 400,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 81 107,935 79,507 7,250 300,000 
Credit card 349 4,347 5,130 40 38,000 
Student loan 56 11,005 11,560 200 55,000 
Vehicle loan 253 13,813 10,107 250 70,000 
Line of credit  290 19,629 29,285 50 150,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 131 17,900 29,233 175 150,000 
Total debts in 1999 714 95,252 86,665 100 669,250 
Total market income in 1999 864 119,394 13,443 100,025 150,000 
Total assets in 1999 864 713,496 676,915 4,776 7,986,500 
b) 2005 
Mortgage on principal 
residence 275 129,353 105,427 4,000 550,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 55 147,721 204,548 2,400 1,450,000 
Credit card 209 6,390 8,246 6 44,000 
Student loan 44 15,564 15,176 250 65,000 
Vehicle loan 172 14,549 10,553 10 57,500 
Line of credit  182 31,911 51,008 575 460,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 71 30,658 54,119 150 360,000 
Total debts in 2005 387 145,230 160,563 475 1,990,000 
Total market income in 2005 479 122,672 14,223 102,500 150,000 
Total assets in 2005 479 1,137,784 1,577,514 250 17,700,000 
c) 2012      
Mortgage on principal 
residence 856 173,765 128,308 1 1,000,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 192 185,183 200,126 150 1,300,000 
Credit card 621 7,288 9,506 20 92,500 
Student loan 159 16,741 18,806 80 100,000 
Vehicle loan 673 22,774 18,038 10 120,000 
Line of credit  570 43,511 76,610 1 900,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 146 21,759 34,180 1 270,000 
Total debts in 2012 1,263 185,899 182,965 1 1,723,500 
Total market income in 2012 1,513 124,587 14,300 102,500 150,000 
Total assets in 2012 1,513 1,161,590 1,027,185 1,050 10,900,000 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
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Table 3.14: Statistics description of different types of debts, total debts, total income, and total 
assets from the 1999, 2005, and 2012 cycles of Survey of Financial Security for households with an 
income level greater than $150K (including) per year   
Debt Variables 
Number of 
observations  
Mean ($) Std. dev. ($) 
Minimum 
amount ($) 
Maximum 
amount ($) 
a) 1999 
Mortgage on principal residence 265 146,920 100,608 5,000 400,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 87 129,390 95,260 1,000 300,000 
Credit card 150 4,968 5,742 50 37,000 
Student loan 17 7,835 6,768 50 24,000 
Vehicle loan 125 18,861 13,891 825 70,000 
Line of credit  185 34,486 41,547 700 150,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 66 39,262 48,503 400 150,000 
Total debts in 1999 419 148,921 128,665 200 616,650 
Total market income in 1999 590 251,685 127,494 150,050 879,000 
Total assets in 1999 590 1,316,763 1,005,636 285 6,885,000 
b) 2005 
Mortgage on principal residence 203 232,018 214,731 2,300 1,450,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 87 300,409 319,759 3,100 1,550,000 
Credit card 122 7,889 8,183 60 40,000 
Student loan 20 17,737 15,660 1,000 62,500 
Vehicle loan 112 21,486 14,461 1,550 70,000 
Line of credit  177 63,744 86,506 20 470,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 46 62,737 94,926 1,150 350,000 
Total debts in 2005 364 250,350 292,267 470 2,072,400 
Total market income in 2005 535 374,561 308,688 155,000 1,900,000 
Total assets in 2005 535 3,200,850 4,263,363 23,350 49,800,000 
c) 2012      
Mortgage on principal residence 630 239,291 198,157 4,750 1,250,000 
Mortgage on non-principal 
residence 241 333,420 377,970 20 1,950,000 
Credit card 433 9,379 12,665 1 95,000 
Student loan 93 19,564 25,945 200 110,000 
Vehicle loan 535 27,012 24,010 1 165,000 
Line of credit  533 87,833 132,783 1 900,000 
Other loans from financial 
institutions 110 39,852 61,074 1 300,000 
Total debts in 2012 1,087 278,416 316,263 20 2,142,100 
Total market income in 2012 1,412 276,739 235,577 155,000 2,400,000 
Total assets in 2012 1,412 2,469,653 2,581,805 10,975 24,400,000 
Calculated by author using the Survey of Financial Security 
